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Abstract 
Advice taking constitutes a strategy to increase judgment accuracy that builds on 
existing ecological structures. Specifically, averaging the own judgment with that of others 
yields an increase in expected accuracy. Moreover, many decision situations are inherently 
interactive, thereby offering the opportunity to acquire advice before producing a final 
judgment. Theoretically, advice taking is thus highly adaptive. 
However, research on advice taking hinges on three core problems: the uncertain 
adaptivity of advice taking behavior; the lack of a unifying theoretical framework; and the 
conceptual constraints of existing research. First, whereas averaging the own judgment and 
the advice yields highest expected accuracy, individuals often place a relatively low weight on 
the advice during judgment revision. Second, there is no theoretical framework to integrate 
the many determinants of advice taking already identified. Third, advice taking research 
almost exclusively focused on the weighting of advice once it is received, thereby neglecting 
information search. 
The current thesis addresses these three problems from an ecological perspective. This 
perspective assumes that the interactive nature of advice taking affords the individual with the 
opportunity to seek additional information. Specifically, advice taking is conceptualized as a 
sequential process that can be truncated at different points in time, for example after 
consulting different amounts of advice. To this end, the current thesis introduces an expanded 
advice taking paradigm that allows individuals to sample any number of other people’s 
judgments before revising their own. The current thesis proposes an information integration 
account of advice taking that expands existing theoretical ideas, incorporates information 
search and integrates the most important determinants of advice taking as identified by 
existing research. The adaptivity of advice taking is re-evaluated from this ecological 
perspective. A simulation assesses which integration strategy fares best in an environment that 
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accords to the ecological perspective advocated in this thesis. Experiments investigate 
whether individuals explore and adapt to the information ecology when given the opportunity. 
The results suggest that advice taking is much more adaptive than previously 
documented. Placing a low weight on the advice yields higher accuracy than weighting the 
own judgment and the advice equally when advice taking is a sequential process with several 
steps of updating. Moreover, individuals explore and adapt to the information ecology when 
given the opportunity. The experimental data also support the proposed theoretical framework 
of advice taking. This thesis provides strong evidence that the ecological nature of advice 
taking can no longer be neglected by advice taking research. Further discrepancies between 
advice taking in the laboratory and advice taking in the wild, necessary steps to further 
validate the proposed theoretical account, and future directions to investigating the adaptivity 
of advice taking are discussed. 
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1. Returning advice taking to the wild 
In our daily lives, accurate judgments are equally challenging and rewarding. Be it the 
number of refugees fleeing a country due to civil war, the exchange rate of the dollar after the 
presidential election, or the number of people affected by the most recent outbreak of yet 
another influenza virus, the truth can often only be known in retrospect. 
One remarkably easy yet powerful strategy to deal with such judgments under 
uncertainty is to take advice from others. Indeed, averaging several judgments increases 
accuracy (wisdom of crowds; Davis-Stober, Budescu, Dana, & Broomell, 2014; Einhorn, 
Hogarth, & Klempner, 1977; Galton, 1907). Specifically, averaging reduces random error as 
well as opposing biases (Einhorn et al., 1977; Larrick & Soll, 2006). It performs well in a 
wide variety of environments (Davis-Stober et al., 2014) and in comparison to more complex 
models of aggregation (Clemen, 1989). Furthermore, many decisions occur in an interactive, 
social context (Larrick, Mannes, & Soll, 2012; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). Specifically, many 
decision situations cannot be accurately described as either an individual acting in isolation or 
a group of equally involved individuals acting together (Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). Rather, 
individuals often consult others before making a judgment. In fact, cooperation has recently 
been suggested to be automatic (Rand, 2016; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012). Likewise, the 
ability to effectively learn from each other has been suggested to constitute the main 
difference between human intelligence and that of other animals (Herrmann, Call, Hernàndez-
Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007). Advice taking thus offers a way to improve judgment 
accuracy that builds on existing ecological structures (Simon, 1956). Theoretically, it 
constitutes a highly adaptive strategy for judgment under uncertainty (Yaniv & Milyavsky, 
2007). 
1.1 Advice taking 
A variety of research investigates how individuals use advice to adapt and improve 
their judgments (e.g., Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; for a review see 
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Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). Research on judgment aggregation predicts the highest expected 
accuracy to result from simply averaging all available judgments (e.g., Davis-Stober et al., 
2014). Advice taking research thus mainly focuses on the degree to which individuals 
integrate advice received into their judgment during revision (e.g., Soll & Larrick, 2009; 
Yaniv, 2004a). Individuals generally improve their judgment through taking advice (e.g., 
Mannes, 2009; Yaniv, 2004a). At the same time, however, individuals regularly place a 
greater weight on their own judgment than on the advice (egocentric discounting; Yaniv & 
Kleinberger, 2000). 
Advice weighting is sensitive to a number of moderators which can be classified into 
characteristics of the advisee, characteristics of the task and characteristics of the advisor or 
advice (Gino, Brooks, & Schweitzer, 2012). For example, individuals weight advice more 
strongly when they are anxious (Gino et al., 2012). Likewise, increasing the difficulty of the 
task by decreasing the recognizability of the stimulus to be judged increases advice weighting 
(Gino & Moore, 2007; Yaniv & Choshen‐Hillel, 2012). Advice weighting also increases when 
the advisor has a higher expertise (Harvey & Fischer, 1997) or when the advice is costly to 
obtain (Gino, 2008). One highly important determinant of individuals’ advice weighting is the 
confidence in their own judgment (e.g., Gino et al., 2012). Indeed, individuals weight advice 
more strongly when they are less confident (e.g., Gino et al., 2012; Gino & Moore, 2007; 
Moussaïd, Kämmer, Analytis, & Neth, 2013) and confidence mediates the effect of anxiety on 
advice weighting (Gino et al., 2012). However, confidence can also be the outcome of advice 
taking (e.g., Schultze, Rakotoarisoa, & Schulz-Hardt, 2015). Specifically, individuals increase 
their judgment related confidence after receiving advice that is similar to their own judgment 
(Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015; Yaniv, Choshen-Hillel, & Milyavsky, 2009). 
While research has mostly focused on advice taking as a strategy to improve judgment 
accuracy (Mannes, 2009; Soll & Larrick, 2009; Yaniv, 2004a, 2004b), individuals might also 
take advice to share responsibility (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Kennedy, Kleinmuntz, & 
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Peecher, 1997) and to not reject help that they were offered (Harvey & Fischer, 1997). In this 
way, advice taking also constitutes a basic form of social exchange (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; 
Homans, 1958). 
1.2 Three problems of advice taking research 
Research on advice taking has high theoretical and practical relevance. Taking advice 
from others constitutes an easy to use yet powerful strategy that allows individuals to produce 
relatively accurate judgments in light of uncertainty. Advice taking constitutes a basic 
research paradigm to study interactive social decision making. Ultimately, investigating how 
and why individuals (fail to) gain from information obtained from other individuals might 
also deepen our understanding of the merits and perils of a democratic society. 
Advice taking research produced a number of interesting and highly relevant findings. 
However, further progress hinges on three core problems that have to be addressed. First, 
whereas advice taking offers the potential of efficiently and effectively improving judgment 
accuracy, individuals’ realization of this potential appears suboptimal in most advice taking 
studies. Second, despite the many identified determinants of individuals’ advice weighting, 
there is yet no unifying theoretical framework that allows to integrate the most central ones. 
Third, existing research (almost) exclusively focused on advice weighting while neglecting 
advice seeking, constraining the ecological validity and thereby the development of a 
comprehensive account as well as any valid assessment of the adaptivity of advice taking. 
Despite the general improvement in accuracy through taking advice, individuals’ 
advice weighting is widely assumed to be suboptimal (e.g., Mannes, 2009; Yaniv, 2004a). 
Specifically, highest accuracy is expected for weighting the own judgment and the advice 
received equally (e.g., Mannes, 2009). However, individuals regularly place a relatively low 
weight on the advice (e.g., 0.2; Harvey & Fischer, 1997), placing the higher complement (i.e., 
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1-0.2) on their own judgment (e.g., Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000).1 
This egocentric discounting thus appears to preclude optimal gains from taking advice, 
casting doubt on the idea that individuals are able to realize the potential adaptivity of advice 
taking. 
One account of this underweighting of advice assumes an information asymmetry in 
individuals’ minds (Yaniv, 2004a, 2004b). Whereas individuals have at least some access to 
the reasoning underlying their own judgment, this is true to a lesser degree for the reasoning 
underlying some other individual’s judgment. Consequently, the own judgment is weighted 
more strongly than that of others (Tversky & Koehler, 1994). Support for this assumption 
stems from studies reporting stronger advice weighting when the recognizability of the target 
stimulus is decreased (Gino & Moore, 2007; Yaniv & Choshen‐Hillel, 2012), a manipulation 
that likely also affects the number of reasons individuals have in support of their own 
judgment. Some empirical evidence also appears to oppose the information asymmetry 
account. Reminding individuals of the cues their judgment was based on during judgment 
revision does not decrease advice weighting (Soll & Mannes, 2011). From this null-effect, 
one could conclude that the differential availability of reasons does not explain 
underweighting. Alternatively, one could conclude that the mere repetition of information 
underlying the initial judgment was not effective in increasing underweighting tendencies. 
This empirical criticism does not render the information asymmetry account obsolete. 
However, there are two important determinants of advice weighting that the information 
asymmetry account in its current form cannot explain. 
It fails to account for the increase in advice weighting when advice is dissimilar from 
rather than similar to the own judgment (Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015). 
Specifically, while initial research assumed a monotone negative relationship between the 
                                                          
1 This pattern of underweighting has been suggested to actually result from aggregation over several trials in 
which individuals either choose to stick with the own judgment or adopt the advice, with the former being more 
frequent than the latter (Soll & Larrick, 2009). 
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distance of advice from the own judgment and advice weighting (Minson, Liberman, & Ross, 
2011; Yaniv, 2004a), recent research provides ample evidence that this relationship is actually 
curvilinear. That is, advice is weighted most strongly when it is intermediately distant from 
the own judgment but is weighted less strongly when it is close to the own judgment 
(Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015). Rather, close advice leads to an increase in 
confidence (Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015).2 The reasons in individuals’ minds 
should correspond less to advice the more it differs from the own judgment. Therefore, if 
advice weighting was merely a function of the underlying reasons, advice weighting should 
decrease linearly with increasing advice distance. 
Furthermore, the information asymmetry account so far has not been related to 
confidence. Although the accessibility of reasons in support of the own judgment can be 
assumed to be related to the associated level of confidence (Koriat, 2012a; Tversky & 
Koehler, 1994) the account does not explicitly predict this relation. The information 
asymmetry account therefore does not explain how confidence mediates for example the 
effect of anxiety on advice taking (Gino et al., 2012). Likewise, the information asymmetry 
account does not explain how and why advice taking might lead to an increase in confidence 
rather than judgment revision (e.g., Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015). 
While the information asymmetry account is one of the very few existing theoretical 
approaches to advice taking, it has to be expanded to account for the above described 
important determinants of advice taking as identified by existing research. 
However, there is an even more pressing problem of both current theoretical accounts 
of advice taking as well as all existing advice taking research, namely its conceptual 
constraints. Advice taking research almost exclusively focused on the weighting of advice 
                                                          
2 This research also suggests a decrease of advice weighting when advice is very distant from the own judgment, 
presumably because very distant advice is implausible (Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015). However, 
given the recent criticism of testing u-shaped relations using quadratic functions (Simonsohn, in preparation) this 
evidence should be treated with caution. 
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once it is received (e.g., Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Mannes, 2009). While two studies 
investigated whether individuals solicited advice at all (Gino et al., 2012; Gino & Moore, 
2007), no research has yet investigated the process of advice seeking (Bonaccio & Dalal, 
2006; Gino et al., 2012). Specifically, in the classical research paradigm, the individual 
produces an initial estimate for a quantitative estimation task. The individual then receives a 
single piece of advice and in light of this information has the opportunity to revise his or her 
initial estimate. This approach constitutes a serious limitation of the ecological validity of 
advice taking research which is highly problematic with regard to existing theoretical 
accounts as well as any assessment of the adaptivity of advice taking. 
Advice taking has to be preceded by advice seeking in most cases (Bonaccio & Dalal, 
2006; Gino et al., 2012), especially because advice that was not solicited can be seen as 
“butting in” (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997). Furthermore, this constraint of the current research 
limits individuals’ options to react to advice in an unduly manner. Specifically, in the existing 
research individuals could only take the advice or reject it as reliable information. The 
assessment of reliability of the advice in this case is constrained to the information in 
individuals’ minds, which can be assumed to relate to the own judgment more than to the 
advice (Yaniv, 2004a, 2004b). Consequently, the discounting of advice does not appear 
surprising and could even be seen as rational (Ravazzolo & Røisland, 2011). However, given 
that advice taking is grounded in the assumption that most decision situations are interactive 
(Sniezek & Buckley, 1995), the individual’s search for information should not be constrained 
to his or her own mind. Specifically, individuals outside the laboratory have the opportunity 
to investigate the reliability of the advice by exploring their information ecology (e.g., by 
consulting additional advisors). The classical research paradigm thus deprives individuals of 
an option to react to advice received that they have outside the laboratory, namely to seek 
additional information. 
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This constraint is highly problematic on a theoretical level. While the assumed 
skewness of initial information towards supporting the own judgment appears a plausible 
prior for many advice taking situations, the above reasoning renders it highly artificial to 
assume that this skewness cannot be altered. Specifically, information search might increase 
the amount of information relating to the advice received and thereby increase reliance on this 
advice. Existing theoretical accounts have to be expanded by this opportunity. 
This constraint also has two important implications for the adaptivity of advice taking. 
First, if individuals expanded the information in their minds by the information sampled from 
the ecology as suggested above, advice taking might be much more flexible than documented 
by existing research. Second, existing norms for advice taking have only ever considered a 
single instance of judgment updating. In contrast, the opportunity to seek additional 
information renders advice taking a sequential process with consecutive instances of updating. 
Potentially, placing a greater weight on the own judgment than on the advice yields high 
accuracy when several pieces of advice are encountered sequentially. 
1.3 A solution: An ecological perspective 
The goal of the current thesis is to advance research on advice taking by addressing 
the above identified three problems: the uncertain adaptivity of advice taking behavior; the 
lack of a unifying theoretical framework; and the conceptual constraint of the existing 
research. As laid out above, both the evaluation of adaptivity as well as the development of a 
comprehensive theoretical account of advice taking so far were constrained by the lack of any 
conceptualization of information search in advice taking (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Gino et 
al., 2012). The current thesis thus addresses advice taking from an ecological perspective. The 
core assumption of this ecological perspective is that the interactive nature of advice taking 
affords the individual with the opportunity to seek additional information. It is assumed that 
advice taking often is a sequential process that can be truncated at different points in time. 
Thus, depending on characteristics of the decision task, personal factors (e.g., knowledge), or 
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the advice received, people could seek smaller or larger samples of information. For example, 
individuals could consult additional advisors when advice is dissimilar from their own 
judgment. Such interactions between cognition and the information ecology have long been 
recognized (Brunswik, 1955; Simon, 1956) and have recently been studied in related 
paradigms as well (e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Denrell, 2005; Hertwig, 2015; 
Hertwig & Erev, 2009). By introducing this ecological perspective into advice taking 
research, the current thesis strives to contribute to existing research in three ways. 
First, an expanded advice taking paradigm is proposed that allows to incorporate 
information search into advice taking research. This provides the opportunity to investigate 
advice taking in an interactive situation, which is one of the assumed core properties of advice 
taking outside the laboratory (Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). This also provides a conceptual link 
between research on advice taking and related literatures on judgment and decision making 
(e.g., decisions from experience; Hertwig, 2015; Hertwig & Erev, 2009). 
Second, an information integration account is proposed as a theoretical framework for 
advice taking. This is the first theoretical account that allows to derive predictions for 
precursors and consequences of information search in advice taking (Bonaccio & Dalal, 
2006). This account constitutes a necessary starting point to integrate the various findings on 
determinants and outcomes of advice taking and provides a theoretical link to related 
literatures (e.g., Koriat, 2012a; Newell, 2005). 
Third, the adaptivity of advice taking is re-evaluated from this perspective that is less 
constrained than previous conceptualizations. Here, adaptivity will be investigated in two 
ways. First, it will be assessed how far advice utilization is sensitive to the information 
provided by the information ecology. Second, the existing normative considerations for 
advice taking will be re-evaluated in light of the current ecological perspective. Consequently, 
this constitutes the first assessment of the adaptivity of advice taking as it might occur outside 
the laboratory. 
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1.4 Overview of thesis’ structure 
To this end, the current thesis presents one theoretical and three empirical chapters. 
Chapter two focuses on the normative considerations for advice taking from an ecological 
perspective. Data from a simulation is reported that investigates the accuracy resulting from 
different advice weighting strategies in an environment that accords to the ecological 
perspective advocated in the current thesis. 
Chapter three gives a detailed account of the proposed information integration 
framework of advice taking and its core assumptions. It is also illustrated how existing 
findings can be integrated into this framework. 
Chapter four introduces the expanded research paradigm that allows to incorporate 
information search in advice taking. Data from three experiments serve to investigate whether 
participants are willing to seek additional information in the advice taking paradigm and 
whether the opportunity to do so affects advice weighting behavior as assumed by the 
proposed theoretical framework. 
Chapter five investigates participants’ confidence as a proxy for their information 
samples to provide converging evidence for the proposed theoretical framework. To this end, 
data from two additional experiments is reported, in which participants’ confidence was 
measured before and after receiving advice. 
Chapter six discusses the documented evidence in light of the identified three 
problems of advice taking research. It is considered carefully how far the current thesis 
advances research on advice taking, which new questions emerge, and how they can be 
answered by future research. 
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2. Exploiting the information ecology: Re-evaluating existing norms from an 
ecological perspective 
A plethora of research on the wisdom of crowds attests to the fact that simply 
averaging several judgments yields high accuracy (Davis-Stober et al., 2014; Einhorn et al., 
1977; Galton, 1907). Consequently, a variety of studies investigated how individuals make 
use of this strategy, incorporating judgments obtained from other individuals (Yaniv, 2004a), 
groups (Mannes, 2009) or different sources of knowledge (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009). 
However, this research has greatly overlooked the dynamic nature of updating. Specifically, 
with the exception of a few rather peculiar topics, the crowd is not a fixed entity readily 
available to individuals in need of an accurate judgment. Outside of artificial laboratory 
settings, judgment updating most likely resembles a sequential process in which the individual 
consecutively consults different sources of information (cf., decision-field theory, Busemeyer 
& Townsend, 1993; decisions from experience, Hertwig & Erev, 2009). This process has two 
characteristics that have been ignored by existing research. First, the individual accumulates 
information on each instance of updating. Second, the number of judgments to be integrated 
cannot be known in advance. 
Under such circumstances, averaging is more complex than in the idealized setting of 
a fixed number of judgments (N) that need to be accounted for. Specifically, true averaging 
for an a-priori unknown N requires a Bayesian updating algorithm that places a dynamic 
weight of 1/N on the newly encountered information (and the complement of 1 – 1/N on the 
previous judgment). This is not only much more challenging computationally, it also 
necessitates keeping a counter of the previous instances of updating to determine N. Consider 
for example an individual that gives an estimate of 10 (to a fictitious judgment task) and then 
encounters an advisory judgment of 30. Averaging would imply weighting both judgments by 
0.5, or shifting the own judgment half the way towards the advice, resulting in an updated 
judgment of 20. If the individual next encountered a second advisory judgment of 50, 
Returning advice taking to the wild 18 
 
Bayesian updating dictated a weight of 0.66 on the individual’s updated judgment and a 
weight of 0.33 on this second advice, or shifting one third towards the second advice. 
Bayesian updating would thus result in an updated judgment of 30. This updated judgment is 
the average of all three judgments. By contrast, if the individual failed to account for the fact 
that it already updated its judgment after receiving the first advice and thus weighted also the 
second advice by 0.5, the individual’s final judgment would be 35, which misses the average 
by 5 points. 
Research has only investigated a single instance of updating. In this case the own and 
the additional judgment should be weighted equally. The classical finding is that individuals 
assign only low weights to additional judgments, demonstrating “underweighting”. This 
phenomenon has been deemed a serious shortcoming (e.g., Mannes, 2009; Soll & Mannes, 
2011; Yaniv, 2004a). However, as the example illustrates, already at the second instance of 
updating the own judgment should receive twice the weight of the additional judgment. At a 
potential third instance of updating, the individual’s updated judgment ought already be 
weighted three times as strong as the additional judgment. In fact, the optimal weight placed 
on an additional judgment decreases rapidly (and approximates 0; see Figure 1). 
In most instances, the number of judgments (N) ultimately acquired cannot be known 
in advance and keeping an accurate counter of the number of judgments already integrated 
constitutes a demanding task. Under these circumstances, dynamic Bayesian updating is not 
manageable. Instead, it is more feasible to rely on a heuristic strategy that assigns the same 
static weight to each encountered judgment. Such a heuristic might prove a powerful 
integration strategy that emulates the accuracy of Bayesian updating. 
In the current chapter, it is suggested that for a wide range of instances of updating N, 
assigning a low weight (0.1; 0.2) to additional information (and a complementary high weight 
to the own judgment) constitutes such a satisficing solution (Simon, 1956) that approximates 
the accuracy of Bayesian updating. By contrast, if individuals were to weight every additional 
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judgment equally to their own (updated) judgment, as considered optimal in the current 
literature that focuses on single updating instances, accuracy should be much lower compared 
to both Bayesian updating and updating by low weights. To support this claim with empirical 
data and quantify the magnitude of the resulting accuracy differences, a simulation was run. 
 
Figure 1. Optimal weight for a given additional judgment depending on the number of judgments encountered 
previously (1/N). 
2.1 Simulation 
1000 wise crowds were simulated (i.e., groups of 20 judgments whose average 
resembled the truth). From every crowd, one judgment was randomly chosen and assigned the 
role of the individual updating his or her own judgment. This individual was sequentially 
paired with each other member of the respective crowd. Along these pairings the individual 
cumulatively updated his or her judgment in accord with each of several weights (e.g., 0.5, 
0.2, 1/N). As the main dependent measure, the accuracy resulting from each weighting 
strategy was tracked along the pairings. 
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2.1.1 Method 
Wise crowds. 1000 groups of 20 judgments each were created. These judgments were 
drawn at random from a normal distribution with M = 0 (to resemble the truth) and SD = 25, 
which served as a model for a wise crowd. The first judgment was always assigned the role of 
the individual updating his or her judgment. All other judgments served as the judgments the 
individual would be paired with. 
Judgment updating. The individual was sequentially paired with each judgment from 
the respective crowd. For each pairing, the individual’s judgment was updated in accord with 
the following formula: 
judgmentt = (1 – x) * judgmentt – 1 + x * advice, 
with advice being the newly encountered judgment and x being set to each of the 
following weighting strategies: 1/N, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5. For the Bayesian strategy, x was 
dynamically set to 1/N. That is, both the prior judgment and the newly encountered 
information were weighted with regard to the amount of information already integrated. This 
serves as a comparison standard. All other weights assigned were static. That is, the same 
weight was applied independent of whether the individual had previously integrated only 1 or 
already 10 other judgments. According to the assumption, low static weights (0.1; 0.2) should 
perform equally well as the Bayesian strategy for a wide range of N. To test whether this 
applies only to low static weights, the accuracy resulting from x = 0.3, x = 0.4 or x = 0.5, 
respectively, was also tested. 
Updating was cumulative. For example, given the weighting strategy of 0.5, if the 
individual’s initial judgment of 10 was first paired with a judgment of 20, the individual’s 
updated judgment would be 15. This updated judgment (15) was then paired with the next 
judgment (e.g., 25) and resulted in the updated judgment of 20. This process continued until 
the individual had been paired with each other crowd member. 
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Figure 2. Absolute deviation of resulting judgment from true value (0) depending on the number of judgments 
encountered previously (N). 
2.1.2 Results 
The main dependent measure was the absolute deviation of the individual’s updated 
judgment from the truth (here: 0) after having been paired with a given number of additional 
judgments (i.e., for increasing N; Figure 2). As apparent from Figure 2, the dynamic 
weighting (1/N) strategy performs better than all static weighting strategies. While higher 
static weights (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) show a relatively steep increase in accuracy for updating in the 
range of N = [2, 5], lower weights (0.1, 0.2) become more accurate for higher N, in the range 
of N = [6, 20]. Specifically, whereas higher weights reach a relatively stable level of accuracy 
in the range of N = [5, 8], lower weights show an increase in accuracy even for higher 
numbers of N. Interestingly, assigning a static weight of 0.2 appears to closely mirror the 
accuracy of Bayesian updating across the whole range of N investigated. 
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Figure 3. Standardized deviation of resulting judgment from optimal accuracy (1/N) depending on the number of 
judgments encountered previously (N). Standardization was performed for every judgment for a given number of 
additional judgments (N) by subtracting M1/N and dividing by SD1/N. 
To quantify the resulting differences in accuracy, this deviation was standardized in 
relation to the highest accuracy achievable in analogy to Cohen’s d. To this end, the mean and 
standard deviation for the Bayesian strategy (1/N) were calculated for every N across all 1000 
groups. Every judgment (for each remaining strategy and each N) was then standardized by 
subtracting this mean and dividing it by the respective standard deviation. Consequently, the 
resulting score indicates the number of standard deviations (of the optimal strategy) that a 
given strategy’s accuracy deviates from the accuracy of the optimal strategy (pseudo d; Figure 
3). This loss in accuracy in comparison to the optimal strategy supports the above 
interpretation. Higher weights (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) perform well for small numbers of N (range of N 
= [2, 5]) but rapidly deteriorate beyond that range. In contrast to that, lower weights (0.1, 0.2) 
perform slightly less well for small numbers of N but do not deteriorate (and partly even 
improve performance) for the investigated range of N = [2, 20]. Importantly, whereas the 
higher weights all deviate by more than d = 1 in the range of N investigated, the lower 
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weights remain relatively accurate. Interestingly, at least for the range of N = [2, 15], 
weighting by 0.2 never deviates by more than d = 0.5 from Bayesian updating. 
One potential determinant of the loss in accuracy of a given strategy in comparison to 
the optimal strategy could be the summed deviation of the applied weights from 1/N. For 
example, the strategy of .5 does not deviate from 1/N for N = 2, but deviates by .17 for N = 3 
and by .25 for N = 4. Thus, the summed deviation for the strategy of .5 and N = 4 is .42. To 
test whether the summed deviation predicts the standardized loss in accuracy, the summed 
deviation for each strategy for a range of N = [2, 20] was entered into a regression model as a 
predictor for the standardized loss in accuracy. Summed deviation from 1/N strongly 
predicted loss in accuracy, b = .28, se = .01, t = 20.60, R² = .67. 
2.2 Interim discussion 
A variety of research acknowledges the immense potential of averaging and 
investigates how individuals use this strategy to improve their judgments in one-shot 
(laboratory) situations. However, this research failed to take into account the dynamic nature 
of updating outside the laboratory. When information is encountered sequentially, over 
several instances of updating, true averaging amounts to a rather complex, dynamic Bayesian 
updating algorithm. It is argued and demonstrated by means of simulation, that a satisficing 
solution to dynamic, sequential updating need not be complicated. Simply assigning a low 
weight to newly encountered information yields accuracy comparable to that of optimal 
Bayesian updating across a wide range of N. 
Interestingly, this advantage of low weights opposes the normative reference frame 
frequently applied in the existing literature. Specifically, it is often considered a serious 
shortcoming that individuals underweight other individuals’ (Yaniv, 2004a) or groups’ 
judgments (Mannes, 2009) when updating their own. For example, in the classical advice 
taking paradigm, individuals often weight the single piece of advice they receive by roughly 
0.2 (e.g., Harvey & Fischer, 1997). Considering this a one-shot situation this resembles 
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underweighting and causes a loss in accuracy in comparison to weighting the advice by 0.5. 
However, the above simulation shows that shifting the frame of reference to a dynamic, 
sequential process that involves several instances of updating, as more likely outside the 
laboratory, habitually assigning such low weights actually yields higher accuracy and lower 
variability thereof (compare upper and lower panel; Figure 4) than the high weights that have 
been used as benchmarks in the existing literature. Consequently, what appeared a 
shortcoming given the laboratory situation might actually be highly adaptive given the real 
world analog. 
 
Figure 4. Variability of resulting judgment around true value (0; red line) depending on the number of judgments 
encountered previously (N). Every black line indicates accuracy for one of the 1000 individuals simulated. 
The assumption that static, one-shot updating fails to capture updating outside the 
laboratory depends on the following two premises. First, individuals accumulate information 
with each instance of updating and, second, updating frequency is greater than N = 1. It was 
carefully considered how often these premises hold in the real world. The first premise would 
not be met if individuals’ judgments showed compliance rather than conversion. If individuals 
were compliant, they might adapt their judgment in a given situation but would afterwards 
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turn back to their initial judgment (Moscovici, 1980). However, for several reasons it appears 
more likely that judgment updating constitutes information accumulation. Specifically, 
individuals often seek information and advice as a form of informational influence (Deutsch 
& Gerard, 1955), which is more likely to lead to conversion than compliance (Mannes, 2009; 
Moscovici, 1980). Moreover, laboratory experiments investigating judgment updating 
generally leave little room for compliance. For example, in the classical advice taking 
paradigm, individuals work on the judgment task anonymously and in the absence of others 
and should thus not feel a great need to comply with others (Yaniv & Choshen‐Hillel, 2012). 
Second, as apparent from the simulation, both the accuracy differences as well as the 
optimal static weight depend on N. That is, if individuals would not update their judgment on 
more than 4 instances, almost all static weights yield accuracy comparable to that of Bayesian 
updating (except 0.1). However, it appears unlikely that judgments are only updated on such 
rare occasions. For example, literature on decisions from experience documents average 
sample sizes of 11-19 instances (e.g., Hertwig, 2015; Phillips, Hertwig, Kareev, & Avrahami, 
2014). Furthermore, in a digital world that abounds with sources of information easily 
accessible, opportunities for judgment updating are numerous. Consequently, it appears likely 
that individuals seek out a number of additional pieces of information that greatly surpasses N 
= 1. 
The present notion of adaptive small weights in sequential information uptake applies 
to the acquisition of objective knowledge as usually used in advice taking paradigms 
implemented in the lab (e.g., distances between cities, the year of historical events, or the 
caloric content of foods; e.g., Yaniv, 2004a). The present simulation however has implications 
for any type of numerical or quantifiable judgment be it in social or non-social domains. For 
instance, the present notion may also be applied to the formation of accurate impressions of 
other people’s attitudes and beliefs, where it is not the “true” value that needs to be 
Returning advice taking to the wild 26 
 
determined, but rather a representative value that reflects a person’s state of mind or a group’s 
position on a given issue. 
2.2.1 Boundary conditions 
Under what conditions do the present results hold? Outside the laboratory, individuals’ 
judgments likely have already been updated several times, thereby representing more than a 
single piece of information. However, while the simulation investigated updating along 
pairings with individual judgments, the same logic (and thus a similar pattern of results) 
applies when every judgment resembles a (random) amount of information (i.e., a group 
judgment; Mannes, 2009). Only if the amount of information a given judgment contains and 
the order by which these judgments are encountered were strongly positively correlated, the 
here documented advantage of conservative updating would not emerge. That is, only if every 
judgment encountered was based on as many single judgments as the own updated judgment, 
both should be weighted equally. 
Likewise, while research on the wisdom of crowds reliably documents averaged crowd 
judgments to be more accurate than individual judgments (e.g., Davis-Stober et al., 2014), the 
case of a crowd being perfectly accurate (as in the above simulation) might be a somewhat 
strict conceptualization rarely found outside the laboratory. What if the crowd is less wise 
than implemented in the present simulation? Note first, that even the accuracy achievable 
through optimal Bayesian updating is limited by the accuracy of the crowd. As the crowd 
becomes less wise, the accuracy of both optimal dynamic updating as well as static low 
weights deteriorates. Naturally, the here advocated advantage of lower weights as compared 
to higher weights in sequential updating depends on the degree to which averaging of several 
judgments outperforms choosing a random judgment. Specifically, while lower weights 
closely resemble true averaging, higher weights lead to an unduly high impact of the last 
judgment encountered. Thus, if averaging and choosing yielded comparable accuracy, the 
here documented advantage of lower weights would vanish. However, averaging has been 
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shown to outperform choosing in a wide variety of environments (Davis-Stober et al., 2014). 
For every two judgments that enclose or “bracket” the truth, averaging yields a higher 
expected accuracy than random choosing (Larrick & Soll, 2006). Consequently, the likelihood 
of crowd judgments bracketing the truth (as an indicator of the wisdom of the crowd) 
moderates the advantage of lower as compared to higher weights. Note however, that even 
without bracketing, random choosing generally does not outperform averaging. 
The current chapter delivers compelling evidence that the ecological perspective 
advocated in this thesis has immense implications for existing assessments of the adaptivity of 
advice taking. Specifically, theoretical arguments and empirical data suggest that in a 
sequential advice taking process, underweighting of advice in comparison to the own 
judgment outperforms weighting the current judgment and the advice equally and 
approximates the accuracy of optimal Bayesian updating. Consequently, the habitual 
underweighting of advice which individuals display in many advice taking studies might be 
highly adaptive outside the constrained research paradigm. The next chapters complement this 
focus on normative considerations by introducing an information integration framework of 
advice taking and investigating individuals’ actual advice taking behavior in a paradigm that 
allows for information search. 
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3. Expanded information asymmetry account 
The current thesis proposes an information integration account of advice taking. This 
account allows to explain advice taking, information search and their relation and can 
integrate the most central determinants of advice taking as identified by existing research 
(e.g., confidence; Gino et al., 2012; distance of advice; Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 
2015). To this end, the information asymmetry account (Yaniv, 2004a, 2004b) is expanded by 
the opportunity to integrate additional information. As in the original information asymmetry 
account, it is assumed that an individual’s judgment results from an underlying distribution of 
information. However, in line with the ecological perspective advocated here, this information 
sample is not fixed but can be expanded by any additional information received. 
The expanded information asymmetry account has two core assumptions. First, it is 
assumed that any additional information received (e.g., advice) is integrated into the 
individual’s current information sample. Second, individuals are sensitive to the reliability of 
this integrated information sample, which depends on the amount and consistency of 
information, as has recently been proposed by research on subjective confidence (Koriat, 
2012a). 
Note that this does imply that an individual’s judgment and advice received are not 
treated differently per se. Rather, it is assumed that an individual’s judgment usually results 
from an underlying distribution of information (e.g., reasons), while advice classically has 
been operationalized as a single numerical estimate. Thus, in the absence of any additional 
information, advice usually exerts a relatively low influence. 
The assumption that individuals are sensitive to the reliability (i.e., amount and 
consistency) of their current information sample necessitates a distinction between two types 
of information individuals could receive. While the amount of information increases 
regardless of the type of information, new information can either decrease the consistency of 
the overall sample, when it is dissimilar from the current judgment, or it can increase the 
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consistency (or keep it stable), when it is similar to the current judgment. Information that 
increases the consistency of the integrated information sample (or keeps consistency stable 
while increasing the amount) should lead to an increase in confidence (Koriat, 2012a). On the 
other hand, information that decreases the consistency should lead to a shift of the judgment. 
This account can thus explain the qualitatively different patterns in advice utilization 
depending on advice distance. Close advice is more likely to increase the consistency of the 
integrated information sample (or keep it stable while increasing the amount) and should thus 
increase confidence, while distant advice decreases the consistency and thus leads to a 
stronger shift in judgment (Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015). 
Figure 5 illustrates the integration of two different types of additional information into 
the current information sample via a simulation. To visualize the amount and consistency of a 
distribution, the density of that distribution is plotted. The upper panel displays the density of 
three distributions, the initial information sample (N = 10 pieces of information, M = 500, SD 
= 25; outline only) and a distribution of close advice (N = 20, M = 530, SD = 25; golden 
distribution) and distant advice (N = 20, M = 750, SD = 25; red distribution). The lower two 
panels display the effect of integrating different amounts of information from the close or 
distant advice distribution into the initial information sample. The resulting integrated 
information samples are displayed for consecutively adding up to 20 pieces of advice from the 
close (golden) or distant (red) advice distribution. The vertical lines indicate the means of the 
respective integrated information samples (dashed for integrating close advice and solid for 
integrating distant advice). Whereas integration of distant advice greatly decreases the density 
of the integrated information sample this is not the case for the integration of close advice. 
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Figure 5. Upper panel: Density of three distributions, the initial information sample (N = 10 pieces of 
information, M = 500, SD = 25; outline only) and a distribution of close advice (N = 20, M = 530, SD = 25; 
golden distribution) and distant advice (N = 20, M = 750, SD = 25; red distribution). Lower panels: Density of 
the integrated information sample after integrating different amounts of information from the close advice 
distribution (golden) or distant advice distribution (red). The vertical lines indicate the means of the respective 
integrated information samples (dashed for close advice and solid for distant advice). 
This account also predicts previously uninvestigated effects of additional information 
on advice taking. Assuming that additional information is integrated into the current 
information sample, it follows that the more additional information is integrated, the greater 
its impact. That is, if three instead of just one close piece of advice were encountered, the 
increase in confidence should be greater. Likewise, if three instead of one piece of distant 
advice were encountered, judgment revision should be greater (see lower panel of Figure 5). 
This effect of the amount of additional information should be moderated by its consistency 
(Koriat, 2012a). For example, if three advisors closely agreed, their position should exert a 
stronger impact on the integrated information sample. 
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Figure 6. Upper panel: Density of three distributions, the initial information sample (N = 10 pieces of 
information, M = 500, SD = 25; outline only) and a distribution of advice that is as consistent as the initial 
information sample (consistent advice; N = 20, M = 750, SD = 25; golden distribution) and advice that is less 
consistent than the initial information sample (inconsistent advice; N = 20, M = 750, SD = 150; red distribution). 
Lower panels: Density of the integrated information sample after integrating different amounts of information 
from the consistent advice distribution (golden) or inconsistent advice distribution (red). 
Figure 6 illustrates the integration of additional information with two levels of 
consistency into the current information sample via a simulation. The upper panel displays the 
density of three distributions, the initial information sample (N = 10 pieces of information, M 
= 500, SD = 25; outline only) and a distribution of advice that is as consistent as the initial 
information sample (consistent advice; N = 20, M = 750, SD = 25; golden distribution) and 
advice that is less consistent than the current information sample (inconsistent advice; N = 20, 
M = 750, SD = 150; red distribution). The lower two panels display the effect of integrating 
different amounts of information from the consistent advice distribution (golden) or 
inconsistent advice distribution (red) on the density of the integrated information sample. 
Integration of consistent advice leads to a greater shift of density towards the initial advice 
distribution. 
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Likewise, the amount and consistency of the current information sample should affect 
the relative impact of newly encountered information. If the current information sample is 
small, additional information should have a higher impact than when the current information 
sample is large (Weber-Fechner law). This could explain effects of a decreased 
recognizability of the target stimulus on advice weighting (Gino & Moore, 2007; Yaniv & 
Choshen‐Hillel, 2012). In this case, individuals’ initial information sample is likely small, 
thus increasing the impact of additional information (i.e., advice). 
Because subjective confidence is assumed to resemble the reliability of the current 
information sample (Koriat, 2012a) this also provides a link to confidence as a determinant 
and mediator of advice taking. The smaller or less consistent the current information sample, 
the lower the associated level of confidence and in turn the higher the impact of additional 
information (i.e., advice; e.g., Gino et al., 2012; Gino & Moore, 2007; Moussaïd et al., 2013). 
The expanded information asymmetry account assumes that individuals will seek 
additional information when an assessment of their current information sample yields low 
reliability, that is, when it is small or inconsistent. This should be the case when an 
individual’s confidence is low (Koriat, 2012a). Likewise, this should be the case after 
integrating a piece of dissimilar advice (Figure 5). 
Predictions of the absolute amount of information search in advice taking are difficult, 
as this research is the first to ever investigate information sampling in the advice taking 
paradigm. The absolute level of information search likely depends on a trade-off between the 
costs associated with seeking additional information and the benefits of this additional 
information (e.g., Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Lee, Newell, & Vandekerckhove, 2014). Given 
that advice taking research usually employs judgment tasks that individuals feel uncertain 
about (e.g., Gino, 2008) and that over 90% of individuals chose to receive advice when this 
was not mandatory (Gino et al., 2012; Gino & Moore, 2007), it is expected that individuals 
will generally seek some additional information when given the opportunity. 
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The expanded information asymmetry account builds on existing accounts of advice 
taking (Yaniv, 2004a, 2004b) and subjective confidence (Koriat, 2012a) and expands them by 
the opportunity to integrate additional information. It is the first account that conceptualizes 
advice taking as an interaction between the information in individuals’ minds and the 
information ecology. It allows to integrate important existing findings on advice taking and 
can thus serve as a starting point for the development of a comprehensive theoretical account 
of advice taking. The next chapters derive and test hypotheses regarding the precursors and 
consequences of information search in advice taking to assess the validity of this theoretical 
framework.  
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4. Exploring the information ecology: Investigating information search in advice 
taking 
The appeal of advice taking as a strategy to improve judgment accuracy rests on the 
two assumptions that averaging several judgments increases accuracy (e.g., Davis-Stober et 
al., 2014; Einhorn et al., 1977; Galton, 1907) and that many decision situations are inherently 
interactive (Larrick et al., 2012; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). 
However, research on advice taking has hardly ever satisfied the assumption that the 
investigated decision situation is interactive. Specifically, advice taking research has almost 
exclusively focused on the weighting of advice once it is received (e.g., Harvey & Fischer, 
1997; Mannes, 2009). While two studies investigated whether advice was solicited at all 
(Gino et al., 2012; Gino & Moore, 2007) no research has yet investigated the process of 
advice seeking (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Gino et al., 2012). The existing research on advice 
taking thus never really allowed individuals to interact with their information ecology. 
Consequently, this research does not allow any inference with regard to individuals’ advice 
taking behavior in a decision situation that truly is interactive. 
To overcome this constraint, the current chapter establishes an advice taking paradigm 
that allows individuals to sample any number of other people’s judgments before revising 
their judgment. While individuals generally could seek additional information in the form of 
both advice or underlying reasons, the current thesis focuses on the sampling of additional 
advice for three reasons. First, in everyday life the judgments of other people can be observed 
more frequently than the reasons underlying a judgment. Second, when judgments are based 
on intuition, concrete reasons are often not available or constructed after the fact (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). Third, it is assumed that a judgment is evaluated in accordance with the 
amount and consistency of information as in an assessment of reliability, a principle that 
should be applicable to the number and consistency of advisory judgments as well as the 
number and consistency of supporting reasons (Koriat, 2012a). 
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The current thesis is the first to investigate advice taking from an ecological 
perspective, covering both advice seeking and weighting. This approach is necessary for the 
proper evaluation of the adaptivity of advice taking. Specifically, given that the information in 
individuals’ minds is assumed to be skewed towards supporting the own judgment (Yaniv, 
2004a, 2004b), it might be considered rational for individuals to underweight advice received, 
if this advice constitutes a single piece of information (Ravazzolo & Røisland, 2011). 
However, individuals should adapt their advice weighting to the information provided by the 
information ecology. If, for example, several advisors closely agreed on a position, this 
increased amount of information in support of their position should increase reliance on their 
position. 
This approach also constitutes a necessary first step to the development of a 
comprehensive theoretical account. Specifically, the amount and consistency of individuals’ 
internal information samples can only be approximated, rendering it difficult to test whether 
the information individuals have to begin with determines advice weighting (for an attempt 
see Soll & Mannes, 2011). However, the expanded information asymmetry account predicts 
that additional information received is integrated into this information sample. The amount 
(and consistency) of additional information should thus directly influence advice weighting. 
This assumption can easily be tested. The goal of the current chapter is thus twofold. First, by 
investigating advice taking in a paradigm that allows for advice seeking, this research is the 
first to investigate whether advice taking behavior is sensitive to the information provided by 
the information ecology. Second, it serves as an initial test of the here proposed theoretical 
framework of advice taking. 
4.1 Overview of experiments and hypotheses 
This chapter presents three experiments that followed a general procedure. As in the 
classical approach to advice taking, participants were presented with an estimation task, in 
this case the caloric content of various foods per serving. After giving an initial estimate, 
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participants received an initial piece of advice, supposedly sampled from a distribution of 100 
participants in an earlier study. This piece of advice was either similar to or dissimilar from 
their initial estimate. All three experiments implemented this factor in a within-participants 
design. Experiment 1 resembled the classical research approach without a sampling phase and 
served as an initial test of the weighting functions of the operationalization of close and 
distant advice. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants could sample additional pieces of advice 
at will before giving their final estimate. While Experiment 2 implemented advice that was 
consistent among advisors, Experiment 3 utilized ecologically valid and thereby considerably 
less consistent advice. 
To assess whether the expanded information asymmetry account as a framework is 
suited to explain information search and its consequences in advice taking, the following 
hypotheses regarding advice seeking and weighting will be tested in the three upcoming 
experiments: 
H1: The frequency of advice sampling will be higher when advice is distant from as 
compared to close to participants’ initial estimates. 
H2a: Advice weighting will be higher when advice is distant from as compared to 
close to participants’ initial estimates. 
H2b: Advice weighting will be higher the more pieces of advice participants sampled. 
H3: Confidence will be lower when advice is distant from as compared to close to 
participants’ initial estimates. 
 
4.2 Data analysis 
As dependent measures, the size of the self-determined samples of advisory estimates, 
the integration of advice when forming a final judgment and confidence regarding this final 
judgment were analyzed. As a measure of advice integration, the weight of advice was 
calculated (WOA; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004a), defined as 
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WOAij = (Fij - Iij) / (Aij - Iij), 
where I, F, and A indicate the initial estimate, final estimate, and advice, respectively, 
on a given trial j in a given participant i. To arrive at an estimate for A, the mean of all pieces 
of advice received was calculated. The WOA thus reflects the degree to which participants 
move towards the advice (i.e., a WOA of 1 indicates adoption of the advice; a WOA of 0 
indicates adherence to the initial estimate; a WOA of 0.5 indicates an equal-weighting 
strategy). The WOA thus allows for an assessment of (increasing or decreasing) receptivity 
towards advice as a function of amount sampled or other variables. 
The WOA is highly sensitive to outliers. Outliers primarily result from trials where the 
distance between initial estimate and advice is very small, so that even small alterations of the 
judgment may lead to values outside the range of 0 and 1. Many researchers thus truncate the 
WOA, setting values smaller than 0 to 0 and values greater than 1 to 1 (e.g. Gino, 2008; 
Schultze et al., 2015; Soll & Larrick, 2009), arguing that this practice is unproblematic if it 
concerns less than 5% of all trials. As participants in the expanded paradigm (Experiment 2 
and 3) received multiple pieces of advice that scattered, the WOA fell outside the range of 0 
and 1 on more than 5% of all trials. For the analyses reported, statistical criteria were applied 
to identify and remove outliers on a trial-by-trial basis (Tukey, 1977) rather than altering 
values of WOA. Additional analyses applying the truncation practice yielded similar results, 
but led to a higher number of alterations in Experiment 2 and 3. Note that for the influence of 
sampling on advice weighting, the qualitative pattern of results is unaltered even when no 
trials are excluded. However, the effect of advice distance on WOA reverses (Experiment 1 
and 3) in the absence of any exclusion. 
For all experiments in the current thesis, multilevel model analyses were performed 
for all dependent measures to assess relationships on a trial-by-trial basis (Judd, Westfall, & 
Kenny, 2012). Analyses are based on 20 data points per participant. Following the 
recommendations by Judd and colleagues (2012), all models contained random intercepts for 
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participants as well as items, which were fully crossed by design. The effects of the 
hypothesized predictors were always fixed. The best-fitting model was determined by 
sequentially including the hypothesized parameters and their interactions, one at a time and 
inspecting increase in model fit using the Kenward-Roger approximation (Kenward & Roger, 
1997) for degrees of freedom. Once the best-fitting model was determined, those interactions 
that did not reach a t-value ≥ 2 were excluded (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008), as long as 
this did not decrease model fit significantly. The resulting p-values as well as log-likelihood 
values and approximated Bayes factors (Masson, 2011) for each model are given in the 
Appendix. For the sake of brevity, only the parameter estimates of the best-fitting model are 
reported. 
To summarize, the expanded information asymmetry account predicts that sampling 
behavior will increase with the distance of advice from the participant’s initial estimate (H 1). 
This assumption will be tested in Experiments 2 and 3, by looking for a main effect of advice 
distance on sample size in the multilevel model. A larger sample size for distant as compared 
to close advice is predicted. The expanded information asymmetry account also predicts 
advice weighting to increase when advice is distant and when participants sampled more 
advice. Specifically, it predicts two main effects of advice distance (H2a; Experiments 1-3) 
and amount of information sampled (H2b; Experiments 2 and 3) on the WOA in a multilevel 
model, such that the WOA will be larger with distant (rather than close) advice and larger 
(rather than smaller) samples of advisory estimates. The expanded information asymmetry 
account also predicts that close advice leads to higher confidence than distant advice (H3). 
This assumption will be tested in Experiments 2 and 3, by looking for a main effect of advice 
distance on confidence in the multilevel model. A lower confidence for distant as compared to 
close advice is predicted. 
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4.3 A-priori power analyses 
A-priori power analyses were conducted to determine required sample sizes in all 
three experiments (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). As there is no clear guideline for 
power analyses regarding multilevel modelling utilized in the present research, these 
calculations were based on repeated measures ANOVA designs. Detecting a medium-sized 
effect (f = .25) with sufficient power (β = .95) in Experiments 1 and 2 required collecting data 
of at least 20 participants. A smaller effect (f = .15) was assumed in Experiment 3 due to the 
increased variance in advice, requiring at least 54 participants. As the experiments were part 
of multi-experiment sessions, sample size was increased in accordance with other studies that 
required a larger sample size. 
4.4 Experiment 1 
The first experiment served as a conceptual replication of advice taking procedures 
that do not include a sampling phase using the same materials and basic manipulation as in 
the next two experiments. The expanded information asymmetry account assumes a 
qualitatively different pattern in advice utilization depending on the distance of advice from 
the participant’s initial estimate. Specifically, advice that is close to the participant’s initial 
estimate is more likely to increase the consistency of the integrated information sample or 
keep this consistency stable while increasing the amount of information. Thus, such advice 
should lead to an increase in confidence rather than judgment revision (e.g., Moussaïd et al., 
2013; Schultze et al., 2015). On the other hand, advice that is distant from the participant’s 
initial estimate likely decreases the consistency of the integrated information sample. Such 
advice should thus lead to judgment revision rather than an increase in confidence (e.g., 
Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015). Consequently, the following experiments 
implemented two advice distance conditions. The close condition was intended to confirm 
participants’ initial judgments leading to little judgment revision. In the distant condition, 
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advice was intended to increase participants’ tendency to revise their judgments, as in the 
intermediate distances in Moussaïd et al.’s (2013) and Schultze et al.’s (2015) work. 
4.4.1 Method 
Participants. The sample consisted of 35 University of Tübingen students of different 
subjects (10 males; Mage= 23.00 years, SDage= 6.18).
3 Participants took part in a one-hour 
session comprised of several social cognitive experiments and were compensated with either 
course credit or 7 € and a chocolate bar. Additionally, participants received a small bonus 
payment depending on task performance. Participants were recruited via e-mail and online 
social networks. 
Design. The experiment implemented a 2 (distance of advice: close vs. distant) × 2 
(judgment phase: initial vs. final judgment) within-participants design. 
Materials and procedure. After participants signed a consent form, they were asked to 
estimate the caloric content of various dishes per serving. Names, pictures and caloric content 
of dishes were retrieved from a web page of a German nutrition magazine (www.essen-und-
trinken.de). 30 dishes were pretested using an online sample of 21 participants. Out of those 
30 dishes, those 20 dishes were selected for which the average estimate most closely 
resembled the true caloric content of the dish (e.g., fish pasta). This procedure assured that the 
population had some knowledge about the caloric contents of those dishes (e.g., Gino, 2008). 
The order of dishes was randomized for each participant, as was the order of the 10 
trials per distance condition across the 20 trials. 
For each trial, participants first saw a picture of the dish along with a descriptive label 
and a response box to give their initial estimate. If participants submitted an estimate lower 
than 50 or higher than 1250 calories per serving, the software prompted them to give a 
plausible estimate. Next, they were shown another estimate for that same dish. These 
                                                          
3 Due to a programming error, data of five additional participants were not recorded. 
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estimates were allegedly drawn from a pool of estimates of 100 participants in a preceding 
experiment. Depending on distance condition, the advice was simulated as a pseudo-normal 
distribution centering on a mean relatively close to the participant’s initial estimate (on close 
trials) or centering on a mean relatively distant from the participant’s initial estimate (on 
distant trials). Specifically, the mean of the distribution was simulated as i ± .5 × t (on distant 
trials) and i ± .05 × t (on close trials) where i is the participant’s initial estimate and t is the 
true value of the dish. If the participant underestimated in comparison to the true value, the 
proportion was added to the initial estimate; if the participant overestimated in comparison to 
the true value, the proportion was subtracted. Consequently, the advice would generally point 
in the direction of the true value. However, if the initial estimate was very close to the true 
value, the advice could also lead participants away from the true value, by causing them to 
adjust too much. The standard deviation of the distribution was equal for close and distant 
advice. Random noise was added to obscure the artificial nature of advice, drawn from a 
uniform distribution in the range of [-8, +8] calories. 
After receiving advice, participants gave a final estimate for the given dish. For each 
of these final estimates that fell in a range extending 10% on either side of the true caloric 
content of the dish, participants would receive a bonus payment of 0.10 €. During the 
experiment, participants did not receive feedback on their accuracy or their cumulative bonus. 
The bonus was revealed only at the end of the experiment. In total, participants could collect a 
bonus of 2 €. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed, paid, and thanked. 
4.4.2 Results 
Distance of advice. As a manipulation check, the absolute difference between 
participants’ initial estimates and the initial piece of advice on the level of trials was assessed. 
Whereas participants’ initial estimate and the initial piece of advice differed by only M = 
30.80 (SD = 21.19) calories on close trials, they differed by M = 241.85 (SD = 83.44) calories 
on distant trials. 
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The normalized distance in line with Moussaïd et al. (2013) was also calculated: 
∆Eij = |Iij - Aij| / Iij, 
where I and A denote the initial estimate of the participant and the advice, respectively, 
on a given trial j in participant i. Moussaïd et al. (2013) define values below 0.3 as “similar” 
advice, which they found to be related to an updating of confidence rather than an updating of 
one’s judgment. Values between 0.3 and 1.1 were defined as an “intermediate distance”, for 
which strong judgment updating was observed. Values above 1.1 were classified as “very 
distant” and were empirically related to diminishing influence on participants’ judgments. 
Employing the average advice on each trial as the standard of reference, the average ∆E 
amounted to M = .07 (SD = .06) in the close condition and to M = .53 (SD = .28) in the distant 
condition. The operationalizations of the close and distant conditions thus resemble the 
“similar” and “intermediate” distance conditions of Moussaïd et al. (2013). 
As a result of the distance manipulation, participants’ initial estimate and the advice 
enclosed the true value in 79% of the distant trials, but only 17% of the close trials. 
Weighting of advice. Trials with a WOA < -0.42 and WOA > 0.67 were excluded 
(Tukey, 1977). In total, 49 of 700 trials were excluded (7.00%). 
The expanded information asymmetry account predicts that advice weighting is 
greater when advice is distant from as compared to close to a participant’s initial estimate. 
The following model was fit for advice weighting: 
WOAij = α0 + b1Distancej + ε, 
where index i refers to participants and index j to questions. For this and all following 
models close advice was coded as 0 and distant advice as 1. The effect of Distance thus 
indicates the consequences of increasing advice distance from close to distant advice. 
Replicating the results of other authors, advice distance significantly increased participants’ 
WOA, b1 = .12, se = .01, t = 10.65 (Figure 7), although fit indices indicated worse fit for this 
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model over the null model in this specific data set. In all subsequent experiments, including 
distance as a predictor of WOA improved model fit (Appendix). 
4.4.3 Discussion 
Participants weighted the advice stronger when it was distant from rather than close to 
their initial estimates. These results validate the manipulation of advice distance replicating 
the finding of greater weighting for advice of intermediate rather than small distance (e.g., 
Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 7. Weight of advice (WOA) for close and distant trials of Experiments 1-3. Error bars represent standard 
errors of the means. 
4.5 Experiment 2 
The second experiment introduced a sampling phase that allowed participants to 
sample as many pieces of advice as desired. This experiment allowed to assess whether 
distant advice indeed leads to an increased frequency of advice sampling. Furthermore, this 
experiment allowed to investigate whether advice weighting is sensitive to the number of 
pieces of advice received. In order to investigate whether close advice as operationalized here 
actually led to higher levels of confidence, a confidence measure was introduced after each 
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final estimate. That was done for only half of the participants to assess potential effects of 
reflecting on one’s confidence. 
4.5.1 Method 
Participants. The sample consisted of 44 University of Heidelberg students (14 males; 
Mage = 26.48 years, SDage = 8.81). The study was run as part of an experimental session of 
approximately 45 minutes. Participants received either course credit or a monetary 
compensation of 6 €. Additionally, participants received a performance-contingent bonus as in 
Experiment 1. 
Design. This experiment implemented a 2 (distance of advice: close vs. distant) × 2 
(judgment phase: initial vs. final judgment) within-participants design. Additionally, half of 
the participants [N = 22] were asked to provide confidence ratings for their final estimates. 
Materials and procedure. Up to eight participants took part at the same time, each 
seated in a separate cubicle. Materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 with two 
exceptions. First, after receiving a close or a distant piece of advice on the caloric content of a 
given dish, participants were allowed to sample as many other estimates as desired. The 
sampling phase was however capped at 20 pieces of advice. Advice was consistently drawn 
from either the close or distant distribution depending on distance condition. Second, 
participants in the confidence ratings condition also rated their confidence on a 7-point scale 
anchored at -3 = “very unconfident” and 3 = “very confident” after each trial while 
participants in the no confidence ratings condition proceeded without any further questions. 
As the presence or absence of confidence ratings did not exert effects on any dependent 
measure, this factor will not be discussed any further. 
4.5.2 Results 
Distance of advice. As a manipulation check, the absolute difference between 
participants’ initial estimates and the average advice for each trial was assessed. Whereas 
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participants’ initial estimate and the advice differed by only M = 26.34 (SD = 15.75) calories 
on close trials, they differed by M = 246.18 (SD = 77.57) calories on distant trials. 
The ∆E to the average advice amounted to M = .06 (SD = .06) in the close condition 
and to M = .54 (SD = .26) in the distant condition. Hence, a “similar” and “intermediate” 
distance condition in terms of Moussaïd et al. (2013) were realized. 
As a result, participants’ initial estimate was enclosed by the range of advice for 51% 
of close trials but for none of the distant trials. Initial estimate and range of advice enclosed 
the true value on 22% of the close and 84% of the distant trials. 
Sampling of advice. As this is the first research to investigate advice seeking, the 
absolute number of pieces of advice sampled was assessed in order to back up the assumption 
that participants are generally willing to seek additional information in the advice taking 
paradigm. In support of this assumption, participants sampled more pieces of advice than the 
one piece classically offered. The average of M = 8.05 (SD = 7.00) advisory estimates 
sampled by participants across distance conditions was significantly larger than one, t(43) = 
7.27, p < .001, d = 1.10. 
Further, the expanded information asymmetry account predicts an increase in 
sampling frequency when advice is distant. For advice sampling, the model with the best fit 
was the following: 
Sample sizeij = α0 + b1Distancej + ε. 
Advice distance significantly increased sample size, b1 = 1.53, se = .20, t = 7.82. That 
is, receiving advice that was distant from their initial estimate led participants to consider 
about 1.5 pieces of advice more than when receiving advice that was close to their initial 
estimate (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Sample size of advisory estimates for close and distant trials of Experiments 1-3. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the means. 
Weighting of advice. Trials with WOA < -0.90 and WOA > 1.40 were excluded, 
amounting to 41 of 880 trials (4.66%; Tukey, 1977). Consistent with Experiment 1, distant 
advice was expected to lead to greater reliance on advice. Testing the assumption of 
sensitivity to the sampled information, increased sampling was expected to increase reliance 
on advice. The following model had the best fit: 
WOAij = α0 + b1Distancej + b2Sample sizeij + ε. 
Replicating the results of Experiment 1, advice distance increased participants’ WOA, 
b1 = .23, se = .02, t = 11.21 (Figure 7). Sampling of additional advice increased the WOA as 
indicated by the effect of sample size, b2 = .015, se = .003, t = 5.66.
4 
The analysis of advice weighting strongly supports the assumption of increased 
reliance on an advisory opinion when it is supported by additionally sampled, consistent 
pieces of advice. To complement the traditional WOA analysis, it was also assessed how the 
weighting strategy employed by participants fit with the normative rule of equal weights 
                                                          
4 For all models containing sample size as a predictor, sample size was recoded by subtracting 1 to account for 
the fact that each participant received at least one piece of advice on each trial. 
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averaging (Mannes, 2009). Therefore the normative WOA participants should have assigned 
to the mean advice on a given trial was calculated as Nadvice / (Nadvice + 1), where Nadvice is the 
number of advisory estimates received on a given trial (Mannes, 2009), and subtracted from 
the actual WOA participants assigned to receive a ∆WOA. For instance, if on a given trial a 
judge received nine pieces of advice, from an equal weighting perspective, the normative 
WOA should be 0.9. If the actual WOA on that trial is 0.6, the ∆WOA would amount to -0.3, 
indicating that the judge underweighted the advice. A positive score in this case implies 
overweighting of advice in comparison to the normative rule of equal weights averaging. The 
best fitting model for this deviation score was the following: 
∆WOAij = α0 + b1Distancej + b2Sample sizeij + b3Distancej × Sample sizeij + ε. 
Replicating numerous studies on failure to follow the normative rule of equal weights 
averaging (e.g., Mannes, 2009), participants fall short of this rule on both, close and distant 
trials (Figure 9). However, assigned weights more closely matched the normative rule when 
advice was distant rather than close, b1 = .17, se = .03, t = 5.81. Although sampling increased 
the weight participants placed on an advisory opinion, it did so suboptimally, as the deviation 
from the normative rule increased with increasing sample size, b2 = -.012, se = .003, t = -3.81. 
This effect was more pronounced for sampling on close as compared to distant trials, as 
indicated by the interaction, b3 = .008, se = .003, t = 2.78. 
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Figure 9. Deviation of participants’ weight of advice (WOA) from equal weights averaging for close and distant 
trials of Experiments 1-3. Error bars represent standard errors of the means. 
Confidence. In line with other authors (Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015), it 
was assumed that receiving close as compared to distant pieces of advice would lead to higher 
levels of confidence. The following model had the best fit: 
Confidenceij = α0 + b1Distancej + ε. 
Indeed, increasing distance of advice decreased confidence, b1 = -.63, se = .07, t = -
9.28 (Figure 10). Additional sampling of consistent advice did not affect confidence as 
indicated by the missing increase in model fit when including sample size as an additional 
predictor (Appendix). 
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Figure 10. Confidence after receiving advice for close and distant trials of Experiments 1-3. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the means. 
4.5.3 Discussion 
Allowing participants to sample additional pieces of advice, the results of Experiment 
2 testify to participants’ willingness to obtain additional information. Further, the effect of 
advice distance on sample size demonstrates that receiving dissimilar as compared to similar 
pieces of advice increased participants’ sampling frequency. In line with the expanded 
information asymmetry account, participants were sensitive to their information samples, 
shifting more strongly towards the advisory opinion the higher the number of consistent 
pieces of advice supporting this opinion they sampled. 
Further validating the distance manipulation as providing information supporting or 
diverging from participants’ initial judgments, confidence was significantly lower on distant 
as compared to close trials. 
4.6 Experiment 3 
The third experiment was intended to investigate the effect of advice that is less 
consistent than in the previous experiments. Specifically, the advice participants sampled in 
Experiment 2 varied only slightly across advisors on a given trial. To increase the variance of 
Returning advice taking to the wild 50 
 
the advice received and also increase the ecological validity of advisory estimates, the 
procedure for computing the advice was altered in this experiment. 
4.6.1 Method 
Participants. The sample consisted of 58 University of Tübingen students (13 males; 
Mage= 21.10 years, SDage= 3.34)
5, who took part in exchange for course credit or a monetary 
compensation of 7 € and a chocolate bar. The experiment was part of a session that lasted 
about 60 minutes. Additionally, participants received a performance-contingent bonus as in 
the previous experiments. 
Design. This experiment implemented a 2 (distance of advice: close vs. distant) × 2 
(judgment phase: initial vs. final judgment) within-participants design.  
Materials and procedure. Materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 2, 
with two exceptions. First, the generation of advice differed in the following way. For each 
dish, the distribution of advice consisted of 100 values drawn at random from a normal 
distribution with the mean and standard deviation of the initial estimates from participants in 
Experiment 2. Depending on distance condition (close vs. distant advice) participants received 
an initial piece of advice that was either drawn from the same decile as their initial estimate 
(on close trials) or from the fifth next decile, above or below their initial estimate, depending 
on which decile their initial estimate fell into (on distant trials). For instance, if a participant’s 
initial estimate fell into the 6th decile, she would receive an initial piece of advice from the 6th 
decile (close trials) or from the 1st decile (distant trials). All additional pieces of advice 
received during the sampling phase were randomly drawn from the distribution of advice for 
the respective dish, independent of distance condition. The mean standard deviation of the 
distributions of advice experienced by participants was M = 163.61 with a range of [125.08; 
214.29]. Thus, the advice received was more inconsistent than in Experiment 2, where the 
                                                          
5 Due to a programming error, data of two additional participants were not recorded. 
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average standard deviation of the sampled advice was M = 24.93 with a range of [6.36; 
46.67]. As a second deviation from Experiment 2, all participants provided confidence ratings 
for their final estimates. 
4.6.2 Results 
Distance of advice. As a manipulation check, the absolute difference between 
participants’ initial estimates and the initial piece of advice for each trial was assessed. 
Whereas participants’ initial estimate and the initial piece of advice differed by only M = 
24.88 (SD = 29.28) calories on close trials, they differed by M = 274.05 (SD = 76.82) calories 
on distant trials. In contrast, the distance between participants’ initial estimate and the average 
advice received, if participants chose to sample, converged as only the distance of the first 
piece of advice was manipulated (close: M = 98.95, SD = 85.11; distant: M = 148.53, SD = 
104.71). 
Likewise, the average ∆E between participants’ initial estimate and the first piece of 
advice amounted to M = .06 (SD = .08) in the close condition and M = .60 (SD = .32) in the 
distant condition. Hence, a “similar” and “intermediate” distance condition in terms of 
Moussaïd et al. (2013) were realized. Averaging across all pieces of advice, ∆E becomes more 
similar between conditions with M = .24 (SD = .32) in the close condition and M = .33 (SD = 
.32) in the distant condition. 
As a result of the greater variance of advice compared to the previous experiments, 
participants’ initial estimate was included in the range of advice for 80% of close trials and 
for 77% of distant trials. Participants’ initial estimate and the sampled advice enclosed the 
true value on 83% of close and 95% of distant trials. 
Sampling of advice. Participants again sampled significantly more advisory estimates 
than the one piece received in previous research, M = 10.26 (SD = 5.98), t(57) = 10.52, p < 
.001, d = 1.77. The following model had the best fit for sample size: 
Sample sizeij = α0 + b1Distancej + ε. 
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Although only the first piece of advice differed as a function of the distance 
manipulation, advice distance increased sample size, b1 = .87, se = .18, t = 4.83 (Figure 8). 
Weighting of advice. Trials with WOA < -0.65 and WOA > 1.03 were excluded, 
amounting to 119 of 1160 trials (10.26%; Tukey, 1977). The following model had the best fit 
for WOA: 
WOAij = α0 + b1Distancej + b2Sample sizeij + ε. 
Increasing advice distance increased participants’ WOA, b1 = .06, se = .02, t = 3.64, 
(Figure 7). Albeit being less consistent among advisors than in Experiment 2, sampling of 
advice again increased the WOA, b2 = .007, se = .002, t = 3.40. 
The traditional WOA analysis was again complemented by investigating participants’ 
behavior in comparison to the normative rule of equal weights averaging (see Experiment 2). 
The model with the best fit was: 
∆WOAij = α0 + b1Distancej + b2Sample sizeij + ε. 
As in Experiment 2, participants fell short of the normative rule on both close and 
distant trials (Figure 9), but came closer when advice was distant, b1 = .05, se = .02, t = 3.23. 
Again, while sampling increased the WOA, it did so suboptimally, b2 = -.009, se = .002, t = -
4.19. 
Confidence. For confidence, the following model had the best fit: 
Confidenceij = α0 + b1Distancej + b2Sample sizeij + ε. 
Replicating the findings of Experiment 2, advice distance decreased confidence, b1 = -
.26, se = .05, t = -5.24 (Figure 10). Additional sampling of advice further reduced confidence, 
b2 = -.035, se = .008, t = -4.46. 
4.6.3 Discussion 
Experiment 3 replicated the findings of Experiment 2 under ecologically more valid 
conditions. Even though the distance of advice was manipulated via a single instance of 
advice only, initially receiving one dissimilar as compared to similar piece of advice led 
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participants to sample more advice and to weight advice more strongly. Despite being less 
consistent among advisors than in Experiment 2, sampling of additional advice increased 
reliance on advice. The effect of advice distance on confidence was also replicated. Moreover, 
in contrast to the previous experiment, sampling of advice generally reduced confidence, as 
advice was less consistent. 
4.7 Interim discussion 
The above experiments are the first to investigate advice taking from an ecological 
perspective, covering both advice seeking and weighting. In accord with the ecological 
perspective advocated in the current thesis, the experiments demonstrate that individuals are 
generally willing to seek additional information (here: additional advice) in the advice taking 
paradigm and that this additional information affects advice utilization. 
The experiments provide initial support to the expanded information asymmetry 
account. As predicted, information sampling was more pronounced when advice was distant 
from participants’ initial estimates (H1). This advice likely decreased the consistency of 
participants’ information samples. In further support of this assumption, distant advice also 
led to greater judgment revision as compared to close advice (H2a), whereas confidence was 
greater after receiving close advice (H3). Most importantly, participants’ advice weighting 
was sensitive to the information samples created through seeking advice. The more pieces of 
advice a participant sampled, the higher the reliance on this advice during judgment revision 
(H2b). This strongly supports the assumption that participants were sensitive to the amount of 
information received. 
A post-hoc comparison of Experiment 2 (coded as 0) and 3 (coded as 1) can serve to 
investigate the effect of consistency of information. When advice was less consistent among 
advisors, additional sampling increased advice weighting to a smaller extent, bSample 
size*Experiment = -.008, se = .003, t = -2.51. Furthermore, participants’ sampling frequency on 
close trials was higher when advice was less consistent, bExperiment = 2.54, se = 1.16, t = 2.18; 
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bExperiment*Distance = -0.67, se = 0.267, t = -2.49 (Figure 8). Finally, the integration of additional 
information that was less consistent led to a general decrease in confidence, as indicated by 
the negative effect of sampling on confidence in Experiment 3. It can thus be assumed that 
participants were not only sensitive to the size of their integrated information samples but also 
to their consistency. 
The current chapter also complements the previous chapter’s assessment of the 
adaptivity of advice taking. In line with the assumption that information search renders advice 
taking a sequential process with several instances of updating, participants sequentially 
sampled on average 9.30 (SD = 6.53; across Experiment 2 and 3) pieces of advice for a given 
judgment task. Thus, a single instance of updating does not appear to capture advice taking in 
an interactive setting. At a first glance, the findings of the experiments and the simulation 
might appear to be at odds. Specifically, the experimental data revealed an increase in advice 
weighting after sampling additional advice. At the same time, the simulation concludes that 
lower weighting of advice yields higher accuracy. In light of this conclusion, the increase in 
advice weighting after sampling additional advice might appear to be maladaptive. However, 
there is a procedural difference between the experimental and simulation design that helps 
reconcile this conflict. The simulation investigated several steps of sequential updating in 
light of single pieces of advice. In contrast, in the experiments, participants reported only one 
updated judgment, after sampling a self-determined amount of advice. Note that consecutively 
assigning a low weight to each single piece of advice yields an increase in the weight on the 
mean of these pieces of advice with an increase in the number of pieces of advice. Thus, 
optimal Bayesian integration demands a higher weight to be placed on a mean that represents 
more pieces of advice. Therefore, the increased weight placed on the mean advice after 
sampling of additional pieces of advice does not constitute a violation of the low weighting of 
advice that yielded high accuracy in the simulation. While advice discounting appears a 
(rational) prior in many advice taking situations, participants were willing to explore the 
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information ecology and increase reliance on the advice when it was supported by additional 
information. Underweighting of advice is thus not an unalienable feature of advice taking but, 
at least partly, an artefact of the classical research paradigm. 
The next chapter will focus on participants’ confidence before and after receiving 
advice to provide converging evidence for the expanded information asymmetry account. At 
the same time, it will be assessed whether the adaptivity of advice taking as documented here 
generalizes to environments where information search is costly. 
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5. Integrating the information ecology: Converging evidence and potential 
boundaries 
One important determinant of individuals’ advice weighting is the confidence in their 
own judgment (Gino et al., 2012). Individuals weight advice more strongly the less confident 
they are (e.g., Gino et al., 2012; Gino & Moore, 2007; Moussaïd et al., 2013) and confidence 
was suggested to mediate the effect of other moderators (e.g., anxiety; Gino et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, confidence can also be the outcome of advice taking. Specifically, individuals 
increase their confidence after receiving advice that is similar to their own judgment (e.g., 
Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015; Yaniv et al., 2009). 
However, there is no existing theoretical framework of advice taking that can explain 
how confidence affects advice weighting and is affected by advice taking. The current thesis 
proposes an expanded information asymmetry account that allows to integrate the above 
reviewed findings regarding confidence as a determinant and outcome of advice taking. 
Drawing on recent research on subjective confidence (Koriat, 2012a) it is assumed that 
confidence reflects an individual’s assessment of the reliability of its information sample 
which in turn depends on the amount and consistency of information. It is further assumed 
that additional information encountered is integrated into this information sample. 
This chapter strives to provide converging evidence for the expanded information 
asymmetry account. To this end, individuals’ confidence will be assessed before and after 
receiving advice. If individuals really integrate additional advice received into their 
information samples, confidence should change as a function of the type and amount of 
information encountered. Specifically, confidence should increase more strongly after 
receiving advice that is similar to as compared to dissimilar from the own judgment. This 
increase in confidence should be greater the more pieces of advice individuals received. 
Note that it is difficult to predict how confidence changes when integrating advice that 
is dissimilar from the own judgment. An initial piece of dissimilar advice decreases the 
Returning advice taking to the wild 57 
 
consistency of the integrated information sample. However, depending on the original size of 
that information sample, several pieces of advice that deviate from the own judgment but are 
highly consistent among each other could lead to an overall increase in the consistency of the 
integrated information sample. While similar advice should linearly increase an individual’s 
confidence in his or her judgment, the relation between integration of dissimilar advice and 
confidence could be u-shaped. Critically, the change in slope from decreasing to increasing 
confidence should be determined by the size and consistency of the individual’s initial 
information sample. As these initial information samples cannot be measured, it is difficult to 
predict whether individuals’ confidence will decrease or increase as a function of integrating 
dissimilar advice. Given that the judgment tasks employed were selected so that individuals 
have only vague knowledge (e.g., Gino, 2008) it could be expected that even dissimilar advice 
leads to an increase in confidence. 
While the exact amount and consistency of individuals’ integrated information 
samples cannot be measured, smaller or less consistent information samples should be related 
to lower confidence. The smaller or less consistent an individual’s information sample is, the 
more strongly it should be affected by additional information (Weber-Fechner Law). 
Consequently, the lower an individual’s confidence, the higher the expected impact of 
additional information on advice weighting and confidence change. 
Furthermore, the expanded information asymmetry account predicts that individuals 
are more likely to seek additional information when their integrated information sample is less 
reliable. While the experiments in the previous chapter provided support for this assumption 
by documenting an increase in advice sampling for distant as compared to close advice, the 
following experiments allow to assess the hypothesis that lower initial confidence predicts 
increased advice sampling. 
The current chapter focuses on confidence as a determinant and outcome of advice 
seeking and taking. This constitutes an additional test of the assumptions of the here proposed 
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expanded information asymmetry account. Furthermore, it illustrates how the expanded 
information asymmetry account can integrate findings from existing research on advice 
taking. 
5.1 Overview of experiments and hypotheses 
The two experiments reported below followed the same general procedure as the 
experiments of the previous chapter. In both experiments, participants estimated the airline 
distance between several pairs of European cities. After giving an initial estimate, participants 
received one piece of advice. Across trials (i.e., within participants) this advice was either 
similar to or dissimilar from participants’ initial estimates. Next, participants could sample 
additional advisory estimates before giving a final estimate. While sampling in Experiment 1 
was free, Experiment 2 implemented costs of sampling as a between-participants factor. 
To further assess the validity of the expanded information asymmetry account, the 
hypotheses investigated in the previous chapter will be tested again. Given this chapter’s 
focus on confidence, these hypotheses will be complemented by additional hypotheses (bold) 
regarding the role of confidence as a determinant and outcome of advice seeking and 
weighting. 
H1a: The frequency of advice sampling will be higher when advice is distant from as 
compared to close to participants’ initial estimates. 
H1b: The frequency of advice sampling will be higher the lower participants’ 
initial confidence. 
H2a: Advice weighting will be higher when advice is distant from as compared to 
close to participants’ initial estimates. 
H2b: Advice weighting will be higher the more pieces of advice participants sampled. 
H2c: Advice weighting will be higher the lower participants’ initial confidence. 
H3a: Confidence will increase more when advice is close to as compared to 
distant from participants’ initial estimates. 
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H3b: Confidence will increase more the more piece of advice participants 
sampled. 
H3c: Confidence will increase more the lower participants’ initial confidence. 
 
5.2 Data analysis 
As dependent measures, the self-determined sample size of advisory estimates, 
integration of advice when forming a final judgment and change in confidence after receiving 
advice were analyzed. The weight of advice (WOA) was calculated as a measure of advice 
integration in the same way as in chapter four. 
Following the reasoning presented in chapter four, statistical criteria were applied to 
identify and remove outliers on the level of trials (Tukey, 1977) rather than altering values of 
WOA. Additional analyses applying the truncation practice yielded similar results, but led to a 
higher number of alterations than the exclusion of outliers. 
As a measure of participants’ confidence, participants were asked to complement their 
initial and final estimates by range estimates (confidence intervals; e.g., Klayman, Soll, 
González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999). The assessment of initial and final confidence via an 
interval estimate has several advantages. First, it allows for a more fine-grained analysis of 
participants’ confidence as compared to the 7-point scale used in the previous chapter. 
Second, assessing confidence on the very same scale as the judgment it is associated with 
might provide a more direct access to participants’ judgment-related confidence. Specifically, 
it has been argued that individuals outside the laboratory often express their judgment related 
confidence by providing such an interval (e.g., Soll & Klayman, 2004; Yaniv & Foster, 1995, 
1997). Third, given that the here proposed theoretical account assumes confidence to reflect 
the reliability (i.e., amount and consistency) of individuals’ information samples, it might be 
easier for individuals to transform this reliability assessment into a range estimate than into a 
single point on a rating scale. 
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To assess changes in confidence, participants’ final confidence interval was divided by 
their initial confidence interval. Thus, a value smaller than 1 denotes a decrease in confidence 
interval width or an increase in confidence, whereas a value greater than 1 denotes an increase 
in confidence interval width or a decrease in confidence. This proportion was also highly 
sensitive to outliers. Analogous to the analysis of advice weighting, outlier trials were thus 
excluded (Tukey, 1977). 
As in chapter four, multilevel models were computed to assess relationships on the 
level of trials (Judd et al., 2012). Analyses are based on 12 (20) data points per participant for 
Experiment 4 (Experiment 5). Following the recommendations by Judd and colleagues 
(2012), all models contained random intercepts for participants as well as items, which were 
fully crossed by design. The effects of the hypothesized predictors were always fixed. The 
best-fitting model was determined by sequentially including the hypothesized parameters and 
their interactions, one at a time and inspecting increase in model fit using the Kenward-Roger 
approximation (Kenward & Roger, 1997) for degrees of freedom. Once the best-fitting model 
was determined, those interactions were excluded that did not reach a t-value ≥ 2 (Baayen et 
al., 2008) as long as this did not decrease model fit significantly. The resulting p-values as 
well as log-likelihood values and approximated Bayes factors (Masson, 2011) for each model 
are given in the Appendix. For the sake of brevity, only the parameter estimates of the 
respective best-fitting model are reported. 
To summarize, the expanded information asymmetry account predicts sampling 
frequency to increase with lower initial confidence (H1b). This assumption will be tested by 
looking for a main effect of initial CI on advice seeking. It is expected that sampling 
frequency is greater the broader a participant’s initial CI is. The expanded information 
asymmetry account also predicts confidence change to be sensitive to the type and amount of 
information integrated. Specifically, confidence should increase more when close as 
compared to distant advice is integrated (H3a). Likewise, confidence should increase more, 
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the more pieces of advice are integrated (H3b). These assumptions will be tested by looking 
for main effects of advice distance and sampling frequency on confidence change. 
Furthermore, the impact of additional information should be greater, the smaller or less 
consistent participants’ initial information sample (H2c/H3c). This assumption will be tested 
by looking for a main effect of initial CI on both advice weighting and confidence change. It 
is expected that advice weighting and confidence change are greater the broader a 
participant’s initial CI is. 
5.3 A-priori power analyses 
A-priori power analyses were conducted to determine required sample sizes for both 
experiments (Faul et al., 2007). As there is no clear guideline for power analyses regarding 
multilevel modelling utilized in the present research, calculations were based on repeated 
measures ANOVA designs. Detecting a medium-sized effect (f = .25) with sufficient power 
(β = .95) in Experiment 4 (Experiment 5) required collecting data of at least 28 (118) 
participants.6 As the experiments were part of multi-experiment sessions that lasted up to one 
hour, sample size was increased in accordance with other studies that required a larger sample 
size. 
5.4 Experiment 4 
The first experiment employed free sampling of close versus distant advice. The 
design thus replicates that of Experiment 2 in the previous chapter. To test the hypotheses 
regarding the role of confidence in advice seeking and taking, participants were asked to 
provide confidence intervals (CIs) for their initial and final point estimates. 
                                                          
6 Experiment 5 constitutes an integrative analysis of data from two separate experiments (N = 60 and N = 68). To 
avoid the interpretation of random patterns caused by too little power the data was combined. The experimental 
design was equal with one exception. In one experiment, the advice pointed away from the true value on half of 
the trials and toward the true value on the other half, whereas in the other experiment, the advice always pointed 
toward the true value. This quality of advice did not exert a systematic influence and was thus dropped from the 
analyses. The pattern of results was highly similar in both data sets. Aggregation of data should thus increase the 
reliability of the conclusions. 
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5.4.1 Method 
Participants. Forty-two students of the University of Tübingen (15 male; Mage = 
23.38, SDage = 4.59)
7 took part in a session of several psychological experiments that lasted 
about one hour and were compensated with either 7€ or course credit and a chocolate bar. 
Design. The experiment implemented a 2 (distance of advice: close vs. distant) × 2 
(judgment phase: initial vs. final judgment) within-participants design.8 
Materials and procedure. Materials and procedure were equal to those of Experiment 
2, with two exceptions. First, participants were asked to estimate the airline distance in 
kilometers between 12 pairs of European cities (e.g., Cambridge and Belfast: 481km). True 
airline distance for each pair was retrieved from Google Maps (www.google.de/maps). Every 
city was part of only one pair. The order of city pairs was randomized, as was the order of the 
6 trials per distance condition across the 12 trials. 
Second, participants were asked to complement their initial and final estimates by 
range estimates. Thus, there were three response boxes on the screen, one to give their initial 
and final estimate and two for the lower and upper bounds. Participants were asked to use the 
lower and upper bound to create an 80% CI. Specifically, participants were instructed to 
assign a lower bound for which they were 90% certain that the true value would not be lower. 
Likewise, for the upper bound participants were instructed to give a value for which they were 
90% certain that the true value would not be higher. The bonus was determined solely by their 
final estimate and not affected by the associated range. 
                                                          
7 The entries by two participants were regarded implausible (>100) and thus excluded from this descriptive 
statistic. 
8 This experiment originally included a third distance condition. On these trials, participants received advice that 
was very close to their own initial estimate. Specifically, the advice was created by adding random uniform noise 
in the range of [0; 8] to the participant’s initial estimate. This condition was introduced in an exploratory attempt 
to reconcile the contradicting effects of advice distance on advice weighting reported in previous research 
(compare Yaniv, 2004a with Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015). Specifically, whereas Yaniv (2004a) 
originally reported higher weighting of close as compared to distant advice, recent work reliably documented 
higher weighting of distant as compared to close advice (Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015). However, 
as the WOA is extremely sensitive to outliers, which mainly result from trials where the distance between initial 
estimate and advice is very low (see Data analysis), this condition mainly produced outliers of WOA and was 
thus dropped from all analyses. 
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5.4.2 Results 
Distance of advice. As a manipulation check, the absolute difference between 
participants’ initial estimates and the average advice was assessed for each trial. Whereas 
participants’ initial estimate and the advice differed by only M = 30.76 (SD = 55.02) calories 
on close trials, they differed by M = 269.63 (SD = 107.53) calories on distant trials. 
The ∆E to the average advice amounted to M = .07 (SD = .10) in the close condition 
and to M = .77 (SD = .64) in the distant condition. Hence, a “similar” and “intermediate” 
distance condition in terms of Moussaïd et al. (2013) were realized. 
As a result, participants’ initial estimate was enclosed by the range of advice for 61% 
of close trials but for none of the distant trials and participants’ initial CI included the initial 
advice on 90% of close and on 29% of distant trials. Initial estimate and range of advice 
enclosed the true value on 18% of the close and 65% of the distant trials. 
Sampling of advice. The expanded information asymmetry account predicts advice 
seeking to increase when participants’ integrated information sample is small or inconsistent. 
Consequently, both distant advice and low initial confidence should increase advice seeking. 
The best-fitting model for advice seeking was the following: 
Sample sizeij = a0ij + b1Distancej + b2Initial CIij + b3Distancej*Initial CIij + ε. 
Close advice was again coded as 0 and distant advice as 1, so that Distance indicates 
the effect of increasing advice distance. Likewise, participants’ initial CIs were z-transformed 
for all models, so that Initial CI indicates the effect of a CI that is one standard deviation 
broader than the average CI, indicating lower confidence.9 
Replicating the results from chapter four, participants sampled more additional 
advisory estimates when advice was distant rather than close, b1 = 1.63, se = .28, t = 5.76 
                                                          
9 For both experiments, implausible initial CIs (> 15000) were excluded as they were assumed to result from 
typing errors. In Experiment 4, this concerned 1 out of 504 trials (< 0.2 %) and in Experiment 5 this concerned 3 
out of 2560 trials (< 0.2 %). As model comparisons only work when both models were fit to the same data, these 
trials could also not be included in the models whenever initial CI served as a predictor. 
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(Figure 11). In line with the hypotheses, advice seeking was also greater for lower initial 
confidence, b2 = .92, se = .33, t = 2.80. However, this effect was qualified by advice distance, 
b3 = -.76, se = .34, t = -2.22, indicating that confidence only predicted advice seeking when 
advice was close. 
 
Figure 11. Sample size of advisory estimates for close and distant trials of Experiment 4. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the means. 
Weighting of advice. Trials with WOA > 2.33 and < -1.4 were excluded, amounting to 
23 of 503 trials (4.57 %). Analogous to the previous experiments, it was assumed that 
distance and sample size increase advice weighting. Furthermore, lower initial confidence 
should also increase advice weighting. The best-fitting model for advice weighting was the 
following: 
WOAij = a0ij + b1Distancej + b2Sample sizeij + ε. 
Distant advice led to greater judgment revision, b1 = .31, se = .03, t = 9.30 (Figure 12). 
Furthermore, additional sampling10 increased judgment revision, b2 = .011, se = .004, t = 2.75. 
                                                          
10 To account for the fact that every participant received at least one piece of advice, 1 was subtracted from the 
sample size whenever it was used as a predictor in any model. Thus, Sample size indicates the effect of 
additional sampling of advisory estimates. 
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Interestingly, initial confidence did not exert any significant effect on judgment revision 
beyond its indirect influence via advice seeking, as apparent from the missing increase in 
model fit when including this predictor. 
 
Figure 12. Weight of advice (WOA) for close and distant trials of Experiment 4. Error bars represent standard 
errors of the means. 
The traditional WOA analysis was again complemented by investigating participants’ 
behavior in comparison to the normative rule of equal weights averaging (see Experiment 2). 
The model with the best fit was: 
∆WOAij = α0 + b1Distancej + ε. 
As in the previous experiments, participants fell short of the normative rule on both 
close and distant trials (Figure 13), but came closer when advice was distant, b1 = .29, se = 
.03, t = 8.89. However, sample size was not systematically related to the deviation from the 
normative rule. 
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Figure 13. Deviation of participants’ weight of advice (WOA) from equal weights averaging for close and 
distant trials of Experiment 4. Error bars represent standard errors of the means. 
Confidence change. Trials with confidence change > 1.64 were excluded, amounting 
to 29 of 503 trials (5.77 %). Based on the assumption that participants integrate the advice 
received into their information sample, it was expected that close advice increases confidence 
more than distant advice. Likewise, a higher frequency of sampling should lead to a greater 
increase in confidence. Furthermore, confidence should increase more, the lower participants’ 
initial confidence. The best-fitting model for confidence change was the following: 
Confidence changeij = a0ij + b1Distancej + b2Sample sizeij + b3Initial CIij + 
b4Distancej*Sample sizeij + ε. 
Note that values smaller than 1 denote an increase in confidence, which is greater the 
smaller the value. On average, participants increased their confidence after receiving advice 
(Figure 14). Contrary to the assumption, confidence increase was not significantly greater for 
close as compared to distant advice, b1 = .05, se = .04, t = 1.32. While additional sampling 
further increased confidence, b2 = -.009, se = .003, t = -2.55, this was only true for close 
advice, b4 = .010, se = .004, t = 2.78. The influence of advice distance on confidence was thus 
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mediated by advice seeking. Participants with a broader initial CI increased their confidence 
more strongly, b3 = -.096, se = .014, t = -6.84. 
 
Figure 14. Confidence change (Final CI/Initial CI) for close and distant trials of Experiment 4. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the means. 
5.4.3 Discussion 
Experiment 4 provides further support for the expanded information asymmetry 
account. Besides replicating an increase in advice seeking for distant as compared to close 
advice, the number of advisory estimates sampled also increases for lower initial confidence, 
but only when advice is close. Furthermore, confidence change is sensitive to the generated 
information samples, with greater increases in confidence after sampling additional close 
pieces of advice. Interestingly, low initial confidence did not increase advice weighting 
beyond its indirect effect via advice seeking but it led to greater changes in confidence. 
5.5 Experiment 5 
While Experiment 4 provided further support for the expanded information asymmetry 
account, some hypotheses were not confirmed. To increase reliability of the above findings, 
another experiment was run. Additionally, this experiment investigates a highly interesting 
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context factor that is relevant to advice seeking and taking outside the laboratory, namely 
costs of advice. The absolute amount of advice seeking is likely determined by a trade-off 
between the costs of obtaining advice and the benefits associated with this advice (Bonaccio 
& Dalal, 2006). Indeed, participants were found to be less likely to solicit advice at all, when 
this was costly (Gino, 2008) and costs reduced sampling of information in related paradigms 
(Lee et al., 2014). While it is thus expected that costs generally decrease advice seeking, the 
relative increase in advice seeking after integrating distant advice and when initial confidence 
is low should generalize even to a setting where seeking advice is costly. At the same time, 
costly advice was found to lead to greater advice weighting (Gino, 2008; Patt, Bowles, & 
Cash, 2006; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004). If confidence is a measure of advice taking 
analogous to advice weighting, costs could also increase the impact of advice on confidence. 
5.5.1 Method 
Participants. 128 students of the University of Tübingen (26 male; Mage = 22.48, SDage 
= 3.76) took part in a session of several unrelated experiments that lasted about one hour in 
total. They were compensated with either 7€ or course credit and a chocolate bar. Participants 
were randomly assigned to either the free (N = 63) or the costly sampling condition (N = 65). 
Design. The experiment implemented a 2 (distance of advice: close vs. distant) × 2 
(judgment phase: initial vs. final judgment) × 2 (sampling: free vs. costly) mixed design. The 
first two factors were implemented within participants, whereas the third factor was 
implemented between participants. 
Materials and procedure. The experiment was a replication of Experiment 4 with two 
exceptions. First, the number of trials per participant was increased to 20, thus every 
participant received close advice on 10 trials and distant advice on 10 other trials. Order of 
trials and city pairs remained random. Second, advice sampling was costly for half of the 
participants. Specifically, in the free sampling condition, additional advice appeared 
immediately after clicking the respective button. In contrast, in the costly sampling condition, 
Returning advice taking to the wild 69 
 
every additional piece of advice appeared 6 seconds after clicking the respective button. 
During this waiting time, all buttons were disabled. The instructions did not inform 
participants about this waiting time. Thus, participants only experienced during the 
experiment that advice was costly to obtain. 
5.5.2 Results 
Distance of advice. As a manipulation check, the absolute difference between 
participants’ initial estimates and the average advice was assessed for each trial. Whereas 
participants’ initial estimate and the advice differed by only M = 57.62 (SD = 396.50) calories 
on close trials, they differed by M = 282.47 (SD = 393.19)11 calories on distant trials. 
The ∆E to the average advice amounted to M = .10 (SD = .18) in the close condition 
and to M = .75 (SD = 1.07) in the distant condition. Hence, a “similar” and “intermediate” 
distance condition in terms of Moussaïd et al. (2013) were realized. 
As a result, participants’ initial estimate was enclosed by the range of advice for 43% 
of close trials but for none of the distant trials and participants’ initial CI included the initial 
advice on 88% of close and on 26% of distant trials. Initial estimate and range of advice 
enclosed the true value on 11% of the close and 48% of the distant trials. 
Sampling of advice. The best-fitting model for advice seeking was the following: 
Sample sizeij = a0ij + b1Distancej + b2Costsi + b3Initial CIij + b4Distancej*Costsi + ε. 
For all models including costs, the free condition was coded as 0 and the costly 
condition as 1, thus Costs indicate the effect of changing sampling from free to costly. 
Replicating the findings from Experiment 4, distant advice increased advice seeking, 
b1 = 1.31, se = .14, t = 9.31. Interestingly, lower initial confidence also increased advice 
seeking, b3 = .20, se = .06, t = 3.48, and this effect was not qualified by advice distance. As 
expected, costs decreased advice seeking, b2 = -6.23, se = .65, t = -9.51 (Figure 15). Costs 
                                                          
11 Because participants’ initial estimates were not constrained to a plausible range in these experiments but the 
computed advice was, advice was extremely distant on some trials. For the descriptive statistics we thus 
excluded the trials on which the absolute distance was greater than 10000 (3 out of 2560 trials, < 0.2 %). 
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also attenuated the effect of advice distance on advice seeking, b4 = -.94, se = .20, t = -4.76. 
To test whether advice distance increased advice seeking even when advice was costly to 
obtain, the same model was fit separately to data from each cost condition. 
When advice was free to obtain, distant advice, b1 = 1.31, se = .19, t = 6.88 (Figure 
15), and lower initial confidence, b3 = .24, se = .10, t = 2.30, increased advice seeking. 
Likewise, when advice was costly to obtain, both distant advice, b1 = .36, se = .06, t = 6.06 
(Figure 15), and lower initial confidence, b3 = .15, se = .04, t = 3.73, increased advice seeking. 
Interestingly, while the effect of advice distance on advice seeking seems to be attenuated by 
advice costs, the effect of initial confidence appears more pronounced. Z-transforming sample 
sizes within each cost condition to account for the different base lines due to costs, the 
interaction between costs and initial CI is positive, b = .04, se = .03, t = 1.54, but the model 
including this interaction explains the data only slightly better than the model without it, χ²(1) 
= 2.38, p = .12. 
 
Figure 15. Sample size of advisory estimates for close and distant trials in the free and costly sampling condition 
of Experiment 5. Error bars represent standard errors of the means. 
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Weighting of advice. Trials with WOA > 2.17 and < -1.3 were excluded, amounting to 
130 of 2553 trials (5.09 %). The best-fitting model for advice weighting was the following: 
WOAij = a0ij + b1Distancej + b2Sample sizeij + b3Costsi + b4Initial CIij + b5Sample 
sizeij*Costsi + b6Sample sizeij*Initial CIij + b7Costsi*Initial CIij + b8Sample 
sizeij*Costsi*Initial CIij + ε. 
Replicating the findings from Experiment 4, both advice distance, b1 = .27, se = .02, t 
= 16.90, and additional advice sampling, b2 = .015, se = .003, t = 5.08, increased advice 
weighting, whereas initial CI did not, b4 = -.01, se = .02, t = -0.80. Costs did not influence 
advice weighting per se, b3 = -.02, se = .05, t = -0.45, but interacted with both, sample size, b5 
= .042, se = .009, t = 4.38, and initial CI, b7 = -.07, se = .04, t = -1.84, whereas the latter two 
did not interact, b6 = .001, se = .002, t = 0.40. Because the three-way interaction between 
sample size, costs and initial CI was also significant, b8 = .03, se = .01, t = 2.70, the model 
was fit separately to data from each cost condition. 
When advice was free to obtain, both distant advice, b1 = .31, se = .02, t = 13.08 
(Figure 16), and additional sampling, b2 = .014, se = .003, t = 4.70, increased advice 
weighting. Initial CI was not related to advice weighting, b4 = -.01, se = .02, t = -0.77, and did 
not interact with sample size, b6 = .001, se = .002, t = 0.36. 
When advice was costly to obtain, both distant advice, b1 = .23, se = .02, t = 10.81 
(Figure 16), and additional sampling, b2 = .059, se = .009, t = 6.52, increased advice 
weighting. Interestingly, if participants did not sample additional advice, lower initial 
confidence decreased advice weighting, b4 = -.08, se = .03, t = -2.45, but the lower the initial 
confidence, the stronger additional sampling increased advice weighting, b6 = .03, se = .01, t 
= 2.78. 
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Figure 16. Weight of advice (WOA) for close and distant trials in the free and costly sampling condition of 
Experiment 5. Error bars represent standard errors of the means. 
The traditional WOA analysis was again complemented by investigating participants’ 
behavior in comparison to the normative rule of equal weights averaging (see Experiment 2). 
The model with the best fit was: 
∆WOAij = a0ij + b1Distancej + b2Sample sizeij + b3Costsi + b4Initial CIij + b5Sample 
sizeij*Costsi + b6Sample sizeij*Initial CIij + b7Costsi*Initial CIij + b8Sample 
sizeij*Costsi*Initial CIij + ε. 
Replicating the previous experiments, participants weighted advice more in accord 
with the normative rule when it was distant, b1 = .26, se = .02, t = 16.27, additional advice 
sampling, b2 = -.001, se = .003, t = -0.24 and participants’ initial CI, b4 = -.01, se = .02, t = -
0.61, however, did not systematically affect the deviation from the normative rule. Costs 
decreased the deviation from the normative rule, b3 = .11, se = .05, t = 2.19, and interacted 
with initial CI, b7 = -.075, se = .037, t = -2.02, but not with sample size, b5 = .004, se = .010, t 
= 0.37. Sample size and initial CI did not interact, b6 = .000, se = .002, t = 0.11. Because the 
three-way interaction between sample size, costs and initial CI was significant, b8 = .03, se = 
.01, t = 2.63, the model was fit separately to data from each cost condition. 
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When advice was free to obtain, participants’ advice weighting more closely matched 
the normative rule when advice was distant, b1 = .31, se = .02, t = 12.86 (Figure 17), but 
additional sampling did not have any influence, b2 = -.002, se = .003, t = -0.58. Initial CI was 
not related to the deviation, b4 = -.01, se = .02, t = -0.59, and did not interact with sample size, 
b6 = .00, se = .002, t = 0.11. 
When advice was costly to obtain, participants’ advice weighting more closely 
matched the normative rule when advice was distant, b1 = .22, se = .03, t = 10.12 (Figure 17). 
Additional sampling was again unrelated, b2 = .006, se = .009, t = 0.63. Interestingly, if 
participants did not sample additional advice, lower initial confidence increased the deviation 
from the normative rule, b4 = -.08, se = .03, t = -2.48, but the lower the initial confidence, the 
stronger additional sampling decreased this deviation, b6 = .03, se = .01, t = 2.65. 
 
Figure 17. Deviation of participants’ weight of advice (WOA) from equal weights averaging for close and 
distant trials in the free and costly sampling condition of Experiment 5. Error bars represent standard errors of 
the means. 
Confidence change. Trials with confidence change > 1.71 were excluded, amounting 
to 126 of 2553 trials (4.94 %). The best-fitting model for confidence change was the 
following: 
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Confidence changeij = a0ij + b1Distancej + b2Sample sizeij + b3Costsi + b4Initial CIij + 
b5Distancej*Sample sizeij + b6Distancej*Costsi + b7Distancej*Initial CIij + b8Sample 
sizeij*Costsi + b9Sample sizeij*Initial CIij + b10 Costsi*Initial CIij + b11Distancej*Sample 
sizeij*Costsi + b12Distancej*Sample sizeij*Initial CIij + b13Distancej*Costsi*Initial CIij + 
b14Sample sizeij*Costsi*Initial CIij + b15Distancej*Sample sizeij*Costsi*Initial CIij + ε. 
On average participants increased their confidence after receiving advice (Figure 18). 
Replicating the findings from Experiment 4, increase in confidence was not greater for close 
as compared to distant advice, b1 = .05, se = .03, t = 1.82. However, additional sampling 
increased confidence more when advice was close, b2 = -.008, se = .003, t = -3.06, as 
indicated by the interaction between advice distance and sample size, b5 = .005, se = .003, t = 
1.92. Costs did not influence confidence increases per se, b3 = .02, se = .04, t = 0.39, but 
interacted with sample size, b8 = -.030, se = .009, t = -3.41. While advice distance and costs 
did not interact, b6 = .004, se = .036, t = 0.10, the three-way interaction between distance, 
sample size and costs was marginal, b11 = .02, se = .01, t = 1.88. Again, a broader initial CI 
led to a higher increase in confidence, b4 = -.04, se = .02, t = -2.62 and increased the impact of 
additional sampling, b9 = -.005, se = .002, t = -2.54. Initial CI did not interact with distance, b7 
= .02, se = .02, t = 1.00, and costs, b10 = -.02, se = .03, t = -0.80. The three-way interactions 
between distance, sample size and initial CI, b12 = -.002, se = .003, t = -0.85, between 
distance, costs and initial CI, b13 = -.008, se = .046, t = -0.18, and between sample size, costs 
and initial CI did not reach significance, b14 = .01, se = .01, t = 1.40. However, the four-way 
interaction between distance, sample size, costs and initial CI was significant, b15 = -.06, se = 
.02, t = -3.04. Hence, the model was fit separately to data from each cost condition. 
When advice was free to obtain, advice distance marginally reduced the increase in 
confidence, b1 = .05, se = .03, t = 1.79 (Figure 18). While sampling of close advice increased 
confidence, b2 = -.008, se = .003, t = -3.17, sampling on distant trials did so to a lesser degree, 
b5 = .005, se = .003, t = 1.86. Again, lower initial confidence led to a greater increase in 
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confidence, b4 = -.04, se = .02, t = -2.51, and increased the impact of additional sampling, b9 = 
-.005, se = .002, t = -2.44. The interaction between distance and initial CI, b7 = .02, se = .02, t 
= 0.95, and the three-way interaction between distance, sample size and initial CI were not 
significant, b12 = -.002, se = .003, t = -0.79. 
When advice was costly to obtain, advice distance also reduced the increase in 
confidence, b1 = .05, se = .02, t = 2.50 (Figure 18). While sampling of close advice increased 
confidence, b2 = -.037, se = .008, t = -4.56, sampling on distant trials again did so to a lesser 
degree, b5 = .023, se = .009, t = 2.63. Lower initial confidence again led to a greater increase 
in confidence, b4 = -.06, se = .03, t = -2.49. While the interactions between sampling and 
initial CI, b9 = .008, se = .009, t = 0.89, and between distance and initial CI, b7 = .01, se = .04, 
t = 0.36, were not significant, the three-way interaction between distance, sample size and 
initial CI was significant, b12 = -.06, se = .02, t = -3.35. Hence, the sampling of additional 
distant advice increased confidence only when participants’ confidence was low at the 
beginning of a trial. 
 
Figure 18. Confidence change (Final CI/Initial CI) for close and distant trials in the free and costly sampling 
condition of Experiment 5. Error bars represent standard errors of the means. 
Returning advice taking to the wild 76 
 
5.5.3 Discussion 
Experiment 5 replicated all findings from Experiment 4. Crucially, lower confidence 
was again related to more sampling of additional advice and more sampling of close advice 
again led to a greater increase in confidence. While costs decreased advice seeking, the 
reported increase in impact of costly advice on judgment revision was replicated (e.g., Gino, 
2008). Additionally, this increased impact of costly advice generalizes to increase in 
confidence as a measure of advice taking. Interestingly, the missing direct influence of initial 
confidence on advice weighting was also replicated in the free sampling condition. In 
contrast, when advice was costly to obtain, initial confidence influenced advice weighting 
beyond advice seeking by increasing the impact of additionally sampled advice. As in 
Experiment 4, lower initial confidence led to a stronger increase in confidence. In contrast to 
Experiment 4, lower initial confidence also increased the positive effect of additional 
sampling on confidence. 
5.6 Interim discussion 
The current chapter investigates participants’ confidence before and after taking 
advice to provide converging evidence for the expanded information asymmetry account. 
Research on subjective confidence assumes confidence to result from participants’ 
evaluations of the reliability of their information samples which in turn is determined by the 
amount and consistency of information (Koriat, 2012a). Consequently, measuring confidence 
change as a result of the advice received allows to test the assumption that this advice is 
integrated into participants’ information samples. In line with this assumption, confidence 
increased more when participants sampled more advice and this effect was more pronounced 
when advice was close to participants’ initial estimates. 
The two experiments also shed more light on the determinants of information search in 
advice taking. In line with the expanded information asymmetry account, participants sampled 
more advice when their initial confidence was low and when advice was distant. Both relate 
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to a lower reliability of the integrated information sample. While low initial confidence 
should reflect a small or inconsistent information sample (Koriat, 2012a), integration of an 
initial piece of distant advice should decrease the consistency of the information sample, 
regardless of its original size or consistency. In line with the assumption that overall sampling 
frequency is determined by a cost-benefit trade-off (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), costs decreased 
sampling frequency. 
Costs increased the impact of the sampled advice on both advice weighting and 
confidence change. Previous research suggested a sunk-cost fallacy to explain the increased 
impact of costly advice on judgment revision (Gino, 2008). However, in Experiment 5 costs 
not only increased the impact of additional information received, but also the impact of initial 
confidence on advice weighting. Costs also slightly increased the impact of initial confidence 
on advice seeking. It thus appears that costs did not only increase the impact of external 
information, but increased participants’ sensitivity to the information samples in general – 
within their minds and in the information ecology. Similar assumptions have been made 
regarding the influence of benign or malign environments on top-down or bottom-up 
processing (Fiedler & Hütter, 2014). 
5.7 Limitations 
The expanded information asymmetry account allows to derive a number of 
hypotheses regarding the interaction of individuals’ initial information samples with the 
additional information sampled from the ecology. While the majority of hypotheses were 
supported by experimental data, some received only mixed support or would have to be 
rejected given the current data. 
The information asymmetry account assumes that the reliability of individuals’ 
information samples is reflected by their subjective confidence (Koriat, 2012a). It is assumed 
that lower reliability leads to more sampling of additional information. While this hypothesis 
was supported in Experiment 5, sampling in Experiment 4 was only predicted by participants’ 
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initial confidence when advice was close. Potentially, the reliability of individuals’ 
information samples only predicts additional sampling when this sampling increases the 
reliability. Opposing this assumption, distant advice in the same experiment also led to an 
increase in confidence, which according to the proposed account indicates an increase in the 
reliability of participants’ information samples. 
On a related note, it is assumed that additional information that is integrated into the 
current information sample has a greater impact the smaller or less consistent this information 
sample is (Weber-Fechner Law). Consequently, lower initial confidence should increase the 
impact of additional advice on both judgment revision and change in confidence. While the 
experiments document and increased change in confidence when initial confidence was lower, 
the relation between initial confidence and advice weighting was only significant in the costly 
sampling condition of Experiment 5. 
Furthermore, the same amount of additional information did not consistently affect 
advice utilization to the same degree. Specifically, a closer look at data from Experiment 5 
shows that costs greatly reduced participants’ sample size (Figure 15), but did not decrease 
the weight of advice (Figure 16) or the increase in confidence (Figure 18). The results remain 
unaltered when the absolute width of participants’ final CI is modelled instead of confidence 
change. This increased impact of costly advice cannot result from a simple integration of the 
advice into the current information sample in the absence of any other influence factors. One 
would at least have to assume an increased impact of any kind of information in a malign 
environment (Fiedler & Hütter, 2014). However, this effect shows that an account that 
assumes advice utilization to result from pure information integration cannot accommodate all 
determinants. 
While some of the above limitations might just reflect randomness in experimental 
data (e.g., the moderation of the relation between initial confidence and advice seeking by 
advice distance in Experiment 4), others highlight the necessity to include additional 
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processes into the so far purely informational account (e.g., the influence of costs). The 
uncertain influence of individuals’ initial information samples as indicated by confidence 
might reflect a methodological problem. Specifically, subjective confidence only 
approximates the reliability of individuals’ information samples (Koriat, 2012a). Subjective 
confidence, however, can be influenced by many more determinants. In fact, in some studies 
the increased weighting of advice resulted from decreased confidence that was not task related 
(e.g., Gino et al., 2012) and thus should not have reflected individuals’ information samples. 
To truly measure the influence of individuals’ internal information samples, future research 
could manipulate these information samples to gain experimental control (see General 
discussion).  
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6. General discussion 
The current thesis aims to advance research on advice taking by identifying and 
addressing three core problems: the uncertain adaptivity of advice taking behavior; the lack of 
a unifying theoretical framework; and the conceptual constraint of the existing research. To 
this end, an expanded paradigm is introduced which allows to incorporate information search 
in advice taking. A theoretical framework is proposed, that explains advice taking, 
information search and their relation and integrates the most important identified determinants 
of advice taking. Finally, the adaptivity of advice taking behavior is re-evaluated from this 
ecological perspective. In the following, each of these contributions shall be put to careful 
scrutiny. Specifically, it will be assessed how far these contributions advance existing 
research on advice taking, which new questions arise from them and how these questions can 
be addressed by future research. 
6.1 Information search in advice taking 
The current thesis is the first to investigate information search in advice taking. By 
investigating the sequential process of seeking and integrating advice the current research 
answers a repeated call from other scientists (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Gino et al., 2012). 
While previous research only investigated whether advice was solicited at all (Gino et al., 
2012; Gino & Moore, 2007) the current research allows individuals to seek out several 
additional advisors after receiving an initial piece of advice. 
This thesis advances advice taking research for three reasons: First, it constitutes the 
first investigation of advice taking in a situation that allows individuals to interact with their 
information ecology. Second, it allows to assess whether advice seeking and taking is 
sensitive to features of the information ecology, such as the distance or consistency of advice. 
Third, it provides a conceptual link between research on advice taking and related research 
that investigates information search in judgment and decision making. 
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One central claim of proponents of advice taking research is that many decision 
situations are interactive (Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). Consequently, advice taking constitutes 
a way of improving judgment accuracy that builds on existing ecological structures. In stark 
contrast to this claim, no research on advice taking has yet satisfied this assumption of an 
interactive situation (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Gino et al., 2012). This thesis is thus the first to 
present experiments that investigate advice taking in a situation that can truly be described as 
interactive. 
The present experiments demonstrate that individuals are generally willing to seek 
additional information (here: additional advice) in the advice taking paradigm. Moreover, this 
information search is sensitive to features of the information ecology. Individuals sampled 
more additional advice when this advice diverged more strongly from their own initial 
judgment, when they were less confident and when advice was overall less consistent. 
Furthermore, advice utilization was highly sensitive to the information thus sampled. 
Individuals increased their reliance on advice, for both judgment revision and confidence 
change, when they sampled more pieces of advice. This effect of the amount of information 
was moderated by its consistency. Specifically, additional sampling increased reliance on 
advice more, when advice was more consistent among advisors. 
The present research complements findings from a related research area that 
investigates sampling behavior prior to the choosing of options. In research on optional 
stopping, for instance, participants sample (costly) offers until they stop sampling and keep 
the latest offer (e.g., Bearden & Rapoport, 2005; Rapoport & Tversky, 1966; Seale & 
Rapoport, 1997). In research investigating decisions from experience, participants are usually 
presented with two risky lotteries and explore their outcomes before deciding which one of 
these lotteries to play for actual profit (e.g., Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig 
& Erev, 2009). Although there is some debate about the optimal sample size (e.g., Hertwig & 
Pleskac, 2010), this research generally demonstrates that participants sample substantially, 
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investing money and/or time. Moreover, as in the present research the amount of sampling is 
adaptive, being sensitive to the variability of the sample (e.g., Lejarraga, Hertwig, & 
Gonzalez, 2012; Mitra, Reiss, & Capella, 1999; Pachur & Scheibehenne, 2012), the 
importance of the decision (Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008), and competition for the 
choice options (Phillips et al., 2014). 
However, advice taking research differs greatly from the above reviewed literatures in 
the nature of the information presented. Whereas research on decisions from experience and 
optional stopping presents factual information (i.e., individuals’ own observations of 
outcomes), research on advice taking presents social information (i.e., other individuals’ 
judgments). This difference has two important implications. First, it gives rise to different 
underlying motives. Both paradigms usually reward accuracy. However, the social nature of 
advice adds to this accuracy motive a motive to be affirmed by others (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1973; Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000) and a motive to reciprocate or 
cooperate (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Homans, 1958). Second, due 
to the social nature of the information source, the assessment of reliability of advice should be 
influenced greatly by various kinds of social information (e.g., attractiveness; Chaiken, 1979; 
e.g., group membership; Tajfel, 1982). Interestingly, initial experiments investigating the 
integration of information that was framed as either social or non-social suggest that 
individuals are highly sensitive to this framing (Collins, Percy, Smith, & Kruschke, 2011). 
Specifically, whereas redundant information within each framing (i.e., social or non-social) 
was disregarded, redundant information across framings (i.e., social and non-social) was 
weighted more strongly. 
Observing others’ actions constitutes one of the most central processes of human 
learning (Bandura, 1977) and might even have been the cause for the emergence of human 
intelligence (Herrmann et al., 2007; Moll & Tomasello, 2007). Consequently, understanding 
how individuals seek and utilize information provided by others constitutes a highly important 
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research goal. Expanding research on advice taking by the opportunity to seek additional 
information, the current thesis provides a necessary contribution to this endeavor. 
6.1.1 Limitations and future directions 
The current thesis introduces information search into the advice taking paradigm thus 
providing individuals with the opportunity to interact with their information ecology. While 
this constitutes an important advancement of the ecological validity of advice taking research, 
there are a number of features of the ecology in which advice taking most likely takes place 
that have not been investigated in the here documented experiments. 
The current experiments did not provide individuals with any information regarding 
their advisors. However, outside of such deprived laboratory settings it appears highly 
unlikely that individuals receive advice without any information regarding its source. While a 
number of such characteristics of the advisor have been shown to influence advice weighting 
(e.g., conflict of interests; Gino et al., 2012; expertise; Harvey & Fischer, 1997), no research 
has yet investigated how these characteristics relate to the seeking of additional advice. 
Furthermore, some important characteristics of the advisor or the advisee have not yet been 
investigated by advice taking research. Arguably the most important characteristic of any 
individual is its group membership (at least from a social psychologist’s perspective). Indeed, 
individuals are highly sensitive to others’ group membership and often favor in-group 
members (for reviews see Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Tajfel, 1982). For example, in-
group members are trusted more (Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990) and are 
protected more against norm violations (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006). Consequently, 
one could expect advice from in-group members to be weighted more strongly than advice 
from out-group members. At the same time however, groups are often highly homogeneous 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) and tend to think along common lines (Janis, 
1972), potentially limiting the degree to which judgment biases from individuals within a 
group are uncorrelated. Because this uncorrelatedness constitutes an important precondition to 
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maximal gains from aggregation of judgments (Einhorn et al., 1977; Larrick & Soll, 2006), 
utilization of advice from out-group members could yield greater accuracy. This conflict 
between in-group favoritism and normative considerations in the area of advice renders group 
membership an intriguing determinant of advice taking. Likewise, it might be interesting 
whether advice taking is sensitive to social exclusion (ostracism; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; 
Over & Carpenter, 2009; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). Individuals experiencing 
ostracism have been found to conform more to group norms (Williams et al., 2000) and 
imitate others more strongly (Over & Carpenter, 2009). Potentially, experiencing ostracism 
also increases individuals’ motives to cooperate or reciprocate, which in turn might increase 
their willingness to accept advice from others. 
A related limitation to the current research concerns the choice of the information 
source. Specifically, the present experiments only investigated the amount of information 
sought. Outside the laboratory, individuals most likely have the opportunity to choose among 
several information sources. The here documented results suggest that individuals are more 
likely to seek additional advice and revise their judgment in light of diverging advice. 
However, given the opportunity to decide whom to ask for advice, individuals might appear 
less adaptive. For example, individuals are more likely to turn to close and similar others for 
social comparisons (Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002) and even assume these others to be 
representative of the actual population distribution (Galesic, Olsson, & Rieskamp, 2012). 
Likewise, individuals are more likely to bet on judgments that have been revised in light of 
advice that was sampled dependently rather than independently from their own judgment 
(Yaniv et al., 2009). Whereas such a choice of advisor based on similarity might be beneficial 
for matters of taste (Yaniv, Choshen-Hillel, & Milyavsky, 2011), accuracy should benefit 
most from consulting others with maximally different opinions (Larrick & Soll, 2006). 
Consequently, future research should complement this thesis’ focus on the amount of 
information sought by an investigation of the source of information consulted. 
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While the above two paragraphs illustrate that this thesis only constitutes a starting 
point towards the investigation of advice taking from an ecological perspective, the sampling 
paradigm proposed can easily be expanded by additional factors, be it information about the 
source of information or the opportunity to consult different such sources. 
6.2 Expanded information asymmetry account revisited 
The current thesis proposes an information integration account of advice taking. The 
expanded information asymmetry account is the first account that conceptualizes advice 
taking as an interaction between individuals’ minds and the information ecology. 
Furthermore, it provides a theoretical link to related literatures on subjective confidence 
(Koriat, 2012a) and sampling approaches to judgment and decision making (Denrell, 2005; 
Fiedler, 2000; Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Newell, 2005). 
There is no theory of advice taking, let alone advice seeking (Bonaccio & Dalal, 
2006). Previous theoretical approaches were mainly designed to explain isolated phenomena 
of advice taking research. For example, the original information asymmetry account (Yaniv, 
2004a, 2004b) was introduced to explain underweighting of advice and the (then assumed) 
decrease in advice weighting when advice is distant from the own judgment. It was assumed 
that individuals’ information samples are skewed towards supporting the own judgment. 
While this approach is suited to explain the general underweighting of advice (e.g., Yaniv & 
Kleinberger, 2000), it does not allow for the expansion of these information samples, for 
example by exploring the information ecology. Recently, advice taking has been compared to 
a basic stimulus response model (Schultze et al., 2015). This approach was introduced to 
explain the change in advice weighting depending on the distance of advice from the own 
judgment. It was assumed that integration of advice depends on the strength of the stimulus 
(i.e., advice), which is determined for example by its distance from the own judgment. The 
strength of the stimulus might also be greater when several pieces of advice converge. This 
account might thus also explain how advice weighting changes as a function of the amount 
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and consistency of advice received. However, this account completely neglects the 
information samples in individuals’ minds. For example, it does not account for the influence 
of individuals’ knowledge (e.g., Harvey & Fischer, 1997) or confidence (e.g., Gino et al., 
2012) on advice taking. It has long been emphasized that behavior is best understood as an 
interaction between the mind and the information ecology (Brunswik, 1955; Simon, 1956). 
While such interactions are still overlooked too often (Fiedler, 2000; Le Mens & Denrell, 
2011), they have recently greatly advanced research in related paradigms (e.g., Denrell, 
2005). The expanded information asymmetry account constitutes the first theoretical approach 
to advice taking that can account for such interactions. 
Additionally, the expanded information asymmetry account resonates well with 
theoretical models proposed in related literatures. Recent research on subjective confidence 
assumes that individuals’ confidence reflects the reliability of their information samples, 
which in turn is determined by the amount and consistency of the information (Koriat, 2012a). 
The current thesis expands this account by allowing for the integration of additional 
information into these information samples. Likewise, a variety of research employs sampling 
approaches to judgment and decision making to account for interactions between individuals’ 
minds and the information ecology (e.g., Denrell, 2005; Fiedler, 2000; Hertwig & Erev, 2009; 
Newell, 2005). Just as the theoretical account proposed here, this research often assumes a 
continuous integration of additional information into an individuals’ current information 
sample (e.g., Denrell, 2005; Newell, 2005). 
6.2.1 Limitations and future directions 
The current thesis provides evidence that the expanded information asymmetry 
account is suited to explain the precursors and consequences of information search in advice 
taking and can integrate existing findings. However, there are several ways in which the 
account can be expanded and hypotheses could be tested more rigorously. The most intriguing 
ones shall be outlined below. 
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The current work identifies several determinants of individuals’ sampling frequency in 
the advice taking paradigm. In line with the assumption that individuals are sensitive to the 
reliability of their information samples, factors that likely decreased this reliability (e.g., 
distant or inconsistent advice) or indicated a low reliability (low confidence) were related to 
greater sampling of additional advice. However, no predictions were tested with regard to the 
truncation of sampling behavior. Following the above reasoning, it could be assumed that 
individuals truncate sampling once the reliability of their integrated information sample 
reaches a certain threshold (relative or absolute). Indeed, confidence has been successfully 
modelled as a stopping criterion for information search in research on decisions from 
experience (Lee et al., 2014). A comparison of participants’ confidence after receiving close 
and distant advice appears to oppose this assumption. Specifically, both participants’ absolute 
confidence (Experiment 2 and 3) and increase in confidence (Experiment 4 and 5) were lower 
on distant as compared to close trials. However, the experiments were not designed to 
investigate confidence as a truncation criterion for advice sampling. Sampling was capped at a 
maximum of 20 pieces of advice, so that individuals were not entirely free in determining 
their sample sizes. Confidence was only investigated before and after advice sampling. There 
is thus no data revealing how confidence changed throughout the sampling process. 
Potentially, individuals truncated sampling as soon as additional information did not 
sufficiently change the reliability of their information sample any more. Future research 
should thus investigate unlimited sampling of advice and track confidence changes throughout 
the sampling process (e.g., using graphical displays of intervals). 
Such an investigation of confidence throughout the sampling process could also serve 
to shed light on the relation between integration of distant advice and confidence. Whereas an 
initial piece of distant advice most likely decreases the consistency of the integrated 
information sample, distant advice generally led to an increase in confidence in the above 
experiments (although this increase was smaller than for close advice). It was argued that the 
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relation between integration of distant advice and confidence could be u-shaped. Tracking 
confidence throughout the sampling process allows to test this assumption. 
A related consideration concerns the here proposed differences between close and 
distant advice. The distance levels investigated in the above experiments were based on 
findings by other authors (Moussaïd et al., 2013; Schultze et al., 2015) and replicated the 
reported pattern in advice utilization. These authors account for this qualitative difference by 
assuming an area of confirmation around an individual’s judgment. Advice that falls inside 
this area of confirmation increases confidence but does not lead to judgment revision. Advice 
that falls outside this area leads to judgment revision. However, these authors propose models 
which define the area of confirmation based on empirical data aggregated across participants. 
Tracing this pattern back to increases or decreases of the consistency of individuals’ 
information samples affords more precise predictions. Specifically, whether advice primarily 
increases confidence or leads to judgment revision should vary as a function of an 
individual’s specific information sample with regard to a specific judgment task and the 
specific piece of advice received. While the information samples in individuals’ minds are 
difficult to measure, range estimates might serve as a proxy. One could argue that advice that 
falls within an individuals’ range estimate likely increases consistency while advice that falls 
outside the range decreases consistency. Indeed, close advice as operationalized here was 
highly correlated with the initial advice falling inside individuals’ initial range estimates (r = 
.62, for Experiments 4 and 5). Future research could test this assumption more thoroughly by 
manipulating advice distance continuously and pitting absolute distance against advice falling 
in- versus outside of the range estimate as predictors for confidence increase and judgment 
revision. 
A different approach to individuals’ initial information samples can afford even more 
precise predictions. Whereas initial confidence only approximates individuals’ information 
samples (Koriat, 2012a), these information samples could be directly manipulated 
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experimentally. For example, one could design a learning paradigm in which individuals face 
tasks that they have no prior knowledge about (e.g., Harvey & Fischer, 1997). One could then 
present individuals with some information regarding the specific item before presenting 
advice. This approach allows to thoroughly test the here proposed assumption that initial 
information and advice received impact advice taking depending on their amount and 
consistency. For example, it would be expected that the less information individuals were 
presented on a given item, the greater the impact of additionally sampled advice. Initial 
experiments support this assumption. The less training individuals received to predict cue-
criterion relations and the less strong this relation was, the higher they weighted the advice 
received (Harvey & Fischer, 1997). Future research could investigate the integration of 
additionally sampled advice with varying consistency after different levels of training. 
Such an approach could also deliver the data necessary to transform the here proposed 
conceptual model into a computational model that affords even more precise predictions 
about advice seeking and taking. Specifically, some processes need to be investigated more 
closely for the successful development of such a computational model. For example, it is 
unclear how individuals produce a point estimate from a distribution of information. Related 
research suggests that individuals often focus on the mean of distributions, even when this is 
not warranted (Lindskog, Winman, & Juslin, 2013). However, the current research focuses on 
the amount and consistency of information, which might also be assessed in form of the 
relative density (Figure 5). Manipulating the information individuals have and then measuring 
the point estimate they make of it could provide an initial opportunity to disentangle these two 
(and many more possible) opportunities. 
The above paragraphs highlight the fact that the here proposed theoretical framework 
is only a starting point towards a comprehensive theory of advice taking. However, they also 
illustrate that the here proposed account can easily be expanded. More importantly, the 
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expanded information asymmetry account allows to derive a range of specific hypotheses that 
can be tested experimentally. 
6.3 Adaptive advice taking 
The current thesis investigates advice taking from an ecological perspective. This 
constitutes a necessary first step towards assessing the adaptivity of advice taking as it might 
occur outside the laboratory. The results help to reconcile the immense adaptive potential of 
advice taking with the presumed maladaptivity of individuals’ advice utilization. 
The ecological perspective advocated in this thesis claims that advice taking outside 
the laboratory is an interactive process that affords individuals with the opportunity to actively 
search for information. Specifically, advice taking here was conceptualized as a sequential 
process that can be truncated at different points in time, that is, after seeking different 
amounts of advice. 
This ecological perspective has two important implications for the adaptivity of advice 
taking. First, previous research assumed the underweighting of advice in relation to the own 
judgment to be maladaptive (e.g., Mannes, 2009). However, the theoretical arguments and 
simulation data presented suggest a markedly different conclusion. When advice taking is 
conceptualized as a sequential process with several steps of updating, weighting advice by 0.5 
performs poorly. In stark contrast, placing a low weight on the advice yields accuracy that is 
comparable to the optimal integration via Bayesian updating. What has been assumed a 
shortcoming in the literature might thus be highly adaptive outside of the constrained research 
paradigm. 
Second, previous research assumed underweighting of advice to result from skewed 
samples of information that relate more to the own judgment than to the advice (Yaniv, 
2004a, 2004b). However, the present experiments demonstrate that individuals do not stick to 
these information samples but expand them, when given the opportunity. The additional 
information thus acquired strongly affects individuals’ advice utilization. While skewed 
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samples of information might thus be a prior in many advice taking situations, they are not an 
unalienable feature of advice taking. Given the opportunity, individuals explore and adapt to 
the information ecology. 
6.3.1 Limitations and future directions 
The current thesis provides compelling arguments that advice taking outside the 
laboratory might very well be much more adaptive than existing research suggests. 
Nevertheless, some aspects of the adaptivity of advice taking outside the laboratory deserve 
further attention. 
The simulation design assumes individuals’ integration of advice to constitute a lasting 
change of their judgment. Theoretical arguments render this assumption likely. Advice 
probably constitutes a form of informational influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), which is 
more likely to lead to conversion rather than compliance (Moscovici, 1980). However, this 
assumption should be tested empirically. For example, one could assess the time stability of 
individuals’ updated judgments. Likewise, one could assess whether the change in judgment 
due to advice on a specific item generalizes to related items. In line with the here proposed 
assumption that individuals’ point estimates result from an underlying distribution, research 
found that individuals do not merely reproduce their estimate when asked on two occasions 
(Vul & Pashler, 2008). Still, the distribution should change after integrating advice and thus 
the influence of advice should be measurable even after some delay. 
The current thesis suggests habitual low weighting of advice to be effective for two 
reasons. First, individuals accumulate information over several instances of updating. Second, 
perfect Bayesian weighting requires a counter of the integrated information, which individuals 
might not possess. While the accumulation of information is a necessary feature of a 
sequential process, the assumption that Bayesian updating is not manageable might be overly 
pessimistic. Specifically, the proposed theoretical account assumes that individuals’ 
confidence mirrors the amount and consistency of their information samples. Higher 
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confidence could thus indicate that individuals already integrated several pieces of 
information. Consequently, individuals could use their confidence to assign approximate 
Bayesian weights. Indeed, individuals have been found to weight advice depending on their 
confidence (e.g., Gino et al., 2012; Gino & Moore, 2007; Moussaïd et al., 2013). What has not 
been assessed so far is whether such a weighting yields higher accuracy than equal weighting 
independent of individuals’ confidence. 
On a related note, it has been suggested that individuals intuitively rather choose 
among a set of judgments than integrate them into an aggregate (e.g., Mannes, Soll, & 
Larrick, 2014; Soll & Larrick, 2009). Furthermore, recent research revealed that choosing the 
response option associated with the higher level of confidence yields high accuracy (Koriat, 
2012b). However, categorical judgments do not allow for aggregation and the associated 
reduction in error that makes averaging such a successful strategy (e.g., Davis-Stober et al., 
2014; Einhorn et al., 1977). Consequently, it appears an intriguing avenue for future research 
to investigate whether confidence-based choice of a judgment (or advisor) also yields such 
high accuracy for continuous judgments. 
6.4 Ecological validity of advice taking: A disclaimer 
The current thesis investigates advice taking from an ecological perspective. The core 
assumption of this ecological perspective is that the interactive nature of advice taking outside 
the laboratory affords individuals with the opportunity to seek additional information. 
Incorporating this opportunity into advice taking research, the current thesis increases the 
ecological validity of advice taking research. However, there are other ways in which advice 
taking outside the laboratory likely differs from advice taking as studied in the laboratory. 
One such difference that is highly important is the nature of the task studied. Advice taking 
research exclusively focused on continuous judgments (e.g., distance between two cities; 
Schultze et al., 2015). In contrast, advice outside the laboratory often constitutes a 
recommendation of one among several response options. Be it the question which new mobile 
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phone to purchase, which discipline to study or which president to elect, many important 
decisions are categorical rather than continuous. 
The current thesis focuses on continuous judgments as well. This renders it possible to 
expand existing theoretical accounts (e.g., information asymmetry; Yaniv, 2004a, 2004b) and 
allows to use established measures (e.g., weight of advice; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 
2004a) which increases the comparability to existing research. Given that this thesis’ primary 
goal was to emphasize that an ecological perspective has important implications for advice 
taking as investigated previously, this tight link to existing research is highly important. 
Nevertheless, the current work can be expanded to account for categorical judgments. 
The theoretical framework proposed focuses on the amount and consistency of individuals’ 
information samples. These qualities are equally valid for continuous and categorical 
judgments. For example, an individuals’ internal information sample might consist of a 
number of reasons in support of an option A and an option B. While the absolute number of 
reasons resembles the amount of information, the ratio of reasons relating to either option 
could resemble the consistency of the information sample. In this way, additional information 
integrated into this information sample affects both the amount and consistency of 
information just as assumed for continuous judgments here. Additional information that 
supports the current choice increases the consistency (i.e., ratio in favor of current choice) of 
the internal information sample and should thus lead to an increase in confidence rather than a 
change in choice. Additional information that proposes the alternative choice decreases the 
consistency and should thus rather lead to a change in choice. In fact, the assumption that 
amount and consistency of information determine subjective confidence was developed on the 
basis of two-alternative forced-choice tasks (Koriat, 2012a). The fact that the determinants of 
information search in advice taking as identified here converge with the many findings 
regarding information search in research focusing on choice alternatives (e.g., variability of 
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the sample; Lejarraga et al., 2012; Mitra et al., 1999; Pachur & Scheibehenne, 2012) supports 
this analogy. 
A crucial constraint to the generalization of advice taking research to categorical 
decisions lies in the dependent measure of advice taking. The weight of advice provides a 
straightforward measure of integration of advice into the initial judgment. In comparison, 
preference reversal after receiving an opposing recommendation constitutes a rather crude 
measure of advice taking. Potentially, drift diffusion models (Ratcliff, 1978) could deliver a 
more fine-grained measure of advice taking concerning categorical decisions. For example, 
the starting point of the diffusion process might resemble an individuals’ current state of 
knowledge concerning either choice option. Consequently, a shift of the starting point over 
repeated choices could indicate integration of additional information. Such a shift of the 
starting point is not necessarily reflected in a change of choice but rather in a change of 
response latency. Previous research suggests that the specific parameters of the diffusion 
model are indeed sensitive to various manipulations (Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004). 
Future research could thus use diffusion model parameters as a fine-grained measure of 
advice taking for categorical judgments. 
A potential difference between continuous and categorical judgments concerns the 
benefits of aggregation. Research on continuous judgments argues that the combination of 
several judgments via averaging cancels out random error and opposing biases (Davis-Stober 
et al., 2014; Einhorn et al., 1977). Consequently, integrating continuous advice into the own 
judgment yields an increase in expected accuracy. In contrast, categorical judgments do not 
allow for a combination of judgments but only for a choice among judgments. Condorcet’s 
theorem (Condorcet, 1785; Sorkin, West, & Robinson, 1998) holds that the likelihood of a 
majority judgment being correct increases rapidly with an increase in size of this majority. 
However, this is only true when the probability of a single judgment being correct is greater 
than 0.5. It is an open empirical question whether this assumption is true for the categorical 
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judgments individuals face in their daily lives and whether there are cues indicating such 
benign environments (Hertwig, 2012). Consequently, it remains to be investigated whether 
taking advice on categorical judgments increases accuracy. 
While the expansion of advice taking research to categorical decision tasks is beyond 
the scope of the current thesis, the proposed framework constitutes a starting point towards 
this endeavor. 
6.5 Conclusion: Implications of an ecological perspective 
Behavior is best understood as an interaction between the mind and the environment 
(Simon, 1956). It follows that the environment in which a behavior is investigated affects this 
very behavior. To draw inference with regard to a behavior outside the laboratory, the design 
of laboratory experiments thus has to be considered carefully. 
The current thesis argues that existing research on advice taking is too constrained 
conceptually. Specifically, it is assumed that the interactive nature of advice taking outside the 
laboratory affords individuals with the opportunity to seek additional information. A new 
paradigm is proposed that allows to investigate information search in advice taking. A 
theoretical framework is proposed that explains interactions between individuals’ minds and 
the information ecology in advice taking. Finally, the adaptivity of advice taking is re-
evaluated from this ecological perspective. 
The results highlight that this ecological perspective has important empirical, 
theoretical, and normative implications. Individuals explore the information ecology and 
adapt their utilization of advice to the information thus received. Consequently, theoretical 
frameworks of advice taking have to allow for such an interaction between individuals’ minds 
and the information ecology. Finally, current normative considerations have to be changed 
dramatically when conceptualizing advice taking in line with the here advocated ecological 
perspective. 
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Claiming that this thesis returned advice taking to the wild would be too bold even for 
a concluding statement. Advice taking research still has to go a long way before it can inform 
social or political decision making. However, the current thesis does show in which direction 
to proceed. 
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Appendix 
Sequential pair-wise model comparisons 
Experiment 1 
DV Predictors 
Log 
Likelihood 
Df 
(denominator) 
p 
approx. 
Bayes 
factor 
WOA Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) 248.57    
 + Distance 300.8 616.45 < .001 1 
      
 
Experiment 2 
DV Predictors 
Log 
Likelihood 
Df 
(denominator) 
p 
approx. 
Bayes 
factor 
Sample size Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -2317.2    
 + Distance -2287.7 832.74 < .001 1 
      
WOA Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -275.57    
 + Distance -203.42 789.55 < .001 1 
 + Sample size -188.28 197.92 < .001 .999 
 + Distance * Sample size -186.84 798.58 .089 .127 
      
∆WOA Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -255.73    
 + Distance -205.96 789.88 < .001 1 
 + Sample size -202.31 194.12 .008 .570 
 + Distance * Sample size -198.48 798.21 .006 .613 
      
Confidence Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -552.38    
 + Distance -513.25 416.52 < .001 1 
 + Sample size -513.25 429.79 .999 .045 
 + Distance * Sample size -511.47 416.23 .061 .222 
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Experiment 3 
DV Predictors 
Log 
Likelihood 
Df 
(denominator) 
p 
approx. 
Bayes 
factor 
Sample size Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -3067.8    
 + Distance -3056.2 1099.53 < .001 .999 
      
WOA Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -151.25    
 + Distance -143.36 981.51 < .001 .988 
 + Sample size -137.63 218.68 < .001 .905 
 + Distance * Sample size -137.31 992.40 .428 .040 
      
∆WOA Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -166.29    
 + Distance -162.38 980.50 .005 .608 
 + Sample size -154.22 249.76 < .001 .990 
 + Distance * Sample size -154.21 990.55 .898 .030 
      
Confidence Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -1567.6    
 + Distance -1550.6 1091.48 < .001 .999 
 + Sample size -1540.7 1119.16 < .001 .998 
 + Distance * Sample size -1540.7 1087.72 .841 .029 
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Experiment 4 
 
  
DV Predictors 
Log 
Likelihood 
Df 
(denominator) 
p 
approx. 
Bayes 
factor 
Sample size Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -1392.3    
 + Distance -1376.6 458.63 < .001 1 
 + Initial CI -1375.2 453.70 .093 .16 
 + Distance * Initial CI -1372.7 461.15 .027 .343 
      
WOA Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -276.3    
 + Distance -231.9 431.78 <.001 1 
 + Sample size -228.2 202.50 .007 .665 
      
∆WOA Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -265.26    
 + Distance -228.73 431.52 <.001 1 
      
Confidence 
change 
Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -108.07    
 + Distance -93.80 424.40 <.001 1 
 + Sample size -92.14 194.14 .075 .200 
 + Initial CI -70.61 460.96 <.001 1 
 + Distance * Sample size -66.74 421.36 .006 .690 
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Experiment 5 
DV Predictors 
Log 
Likelihood 
Df 
(denominator) 
p 
approx. 
Bayes 
factor 
Sample size Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -6280.45    
 + Distance -6246.69 2422.24 <.001 1 
 + Costs -6206.98 126.00 <.001 1 
 + Initial CI -6201.06 2459.28 <.001 .880 
 + Distance * Costs -6189.75 2420.76 <.001 .999 
      
WOA Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -1442.09    
 + Distance -1286.96 2290.62 <.001 1 
 + Sample size -1266.66 733.63 <.001 1 
 + Costs -1265.17 167.70 .088 .083 
 + Initial CI -1265.15 2389.25 .833 .020 
 + Distance * Sample size -1264.99 2307.55 .568 .023 
 + Distance * Costs -1263.03 2297.76 .049 .125 
 + Distance * Initial CI -1262.82 2346.90 .516 .025 
 + Sample size * Costs -1252.05 1554.99 <.001 .999 
 + Sample size * Initial CI -1251.93 2399.47 .614 .023 
 + Costs * Initial CI -1251.54 2397.31 .384 .029 
 + Dist. * Sampl. * Costs -1251.42 2310.42 .623 .022 
 + Dist. * Sampl. * In. CI -1251.12 2302.29 .440 .027 
 + Dist. * Costs * In. CI -1251.10 2363.05 .834 .020 
 + Sampl. * Costs * In. CI -1247.06 2398.30 .004 .536 
 Parsimonious model -1252.00 2314.14 .129 1 
      
∆WOA Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -1389.07    
 + Distance -1261.74 2292.77 <.001 1 
 + Sample size -1260.61 676.91 .133 .059 
 + Costs -1256.83 169.58 .006 .471 
 + Initial CI -1256.67 2376.13 .571 .023 
 + Distance * Sample size -1254.95 2309.66 .064 .102 
 + Distance * Costs -1252.86 2299.59 .041 .141 
 + Distance * Initial CI -1252.47 2350.83 .379 .029 
 + Sample size * Costs -1252.25 1509.70 .503 .025 
 + Sample size * Initial CI -1252.21 2400.26 .781 .021 
 + Costs * Initial CI -1252.06 2395.23 .586 .023 
 + Dist. * Sampl. * Costs -1252.06 2311.26 .970 .020 
 + Dist. * Sampl. * In. CI -1251.71 2303.53 .406 .028 
 + Dist. * Costs * In. CI -1251.71 2364.81 .939 .020 
 + Sampl. * Costs * In. CI -1247.78 2396.54 .005 .511 
 Parsimonious model -1253.00 2315.37 .104 1 
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Experiment 5 (continued) 
DV Predictors 
Log 
Likelihood 
Df 
(denominator) 
p 
approx. 
Bayes 
factor 
Confidence 
change 
Rnd. Intercepts 
(Participant + Item) -542.86    
 + Distance -513.00 2272.03 <.001 1 
 + Sample size -504.04 756.97 <.001 .994 
 + Initial CI -459.78 2393.91 <.001 1 
 + Distance * Sample size -457.22 2290.64 .024 .207 
 + Costs -456.74 163.68 .331 .032 
 + Distance * Initial CI -453.89 2329.14 .017 .261 
 + Distance * Costs -453.15 2272.05 .226 .041 
 + Sample size * Initial CI -445.31 2378.26 <.001 .981 
 + Sample size * Costs -441.95 1652.18 .010 .370 
 + Costs * Initial CI -441.13 2384.29 .203 .044 
 + Dist. * Sampl. * In. CI -441.12 2282.28 .900 .020 
 + Dist. * Sampl. * Costs -438.35 2286.81 .019 .246 
 + Dist. * Costs * In. CI -430.82 2334.66 <.001 .974 
 + Sampl. * Costs * In. CI -430.82 2381.71 .936 .020 
 + Dist. * Sampl. * Costs 
* In. CI -426.18 2309.53 .002 .678 
      
Note. Degrees of freedom are based on the Kenward-Roger approximation (Kenward & Roger, 1997). For each 
dependent variable (DV), fit of each model was compared to the fit of the model in the row above. Approximate 
Bayes factors were calculated using the BIC (Masson, 2011). The approx. Bayes factor indicates the conditional 
probability of the model being true given the data obtained in comparison to the model in the row above. 
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